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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

PETROVSKIY ON NEED TO CONTINUE DETENTE

Moscow NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 81 signed to press 6 Jan 81 pp 3-20

[Article by Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy, Doctor of Historical Sciences, member of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collegium, senior scientific worker at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of U.S.A. and Canada, author of the monographs "Zagranichnaya sluzhba Velikobritanii" [Great Britain's Foreign Service] (Moscow 1958), "Diplomatiya Dauning Strit" [Downing Street Diplomacy] (Moscow 1964), "Amerikanskaya vneshnepoliticheskaya mysl'" [American Foreign Policy Concepts] (Moscow 1976) and "Doktrina 'natsional'noy bezopasnosti' v global'noy strategii SShA" [The Doctrine of "National Security" in U.S. Global Strategy]: "The USSR's Struggle for Detente in the Seventies"]

[Text] Under the conditions of the present balance of forces in the world, when along with the Soviet Union, a number of the countries of Europe and Asia, and also Latin America, are marching along the road of the building of socialism and communism, and when the three main revolutionary detachments of the age have become a decisive factor in world development, the CPSU is placing on its agenda for international life the question of strengthening a durable and stable, and at the same time just and democratic peace in the world. At the present stage of world development, the CPSU sees the only possible way to insuring such a peace in detente, that is, in the removal of the tension arising within the structure of international relations primarily as the result of the "cold war" policy pursued in the postwar years by the imperialist states. Detente is regarded by the Soviet Union not as a static condition but a dynamic process in the course of which there is a restructuring of international relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Having achieved the implementation of a number of important provisions in the foreign policy program of the CPSU 24th and 25th congresses, the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution to the development and consolidation of detente. On the threshold of the CPSU 26th Congress, the CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum confirmed the unalterable nature of the course toward reducing the danger of war, strengthening international security and limiting the arms race. CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L.I. Brezhnev stressed: "We remain true to the Peace Program put forward by our party's 24th and 25th congresses. Accordingly, now, in the eighties, as earlier in the seventies, we are for the consolidation and not the destruction of detente. For reductions not increases in arms. For rapprochement and mutual understanding among peoples, and not for artificial estrangement and enmity."[1]

When assessing detente from today's positions and the marked complications of the international situation, it is impossible not to see that the results of this policy achieved during the seventies represent one of the decisive factors beneficially affecting present international relations. It can be asserted on very good grounds that it has penetrtaed deeply into people's consciousness and into the fabric of world policy, and has won for itself a fitting status in interstate relations.

Now, no one except the representatives of the extreme reactionary and militarist circles intends to cast aside the concept of detente from his own political lexicon. It is a word used by those who are seriously disturbed by the prospects in the further development of the international situation and the fate of peace, and by those who are concerned only for their own self-interests and who have only short-term political ambitions. The crux of the matter, of course, lies not in the attractiveness of this meaningful and energetic word. The main thing is that by signifying a surmounting of the "cold war" and the switch to normal, equal relations between states, detente represents a true call of the times. The ways and forms of the historial anatgonism between the two different social systems and the fate of peace depend largely on how this matter is preserved and moved forward. The only alternative to detente is the threat of mankind's self-annihilation in nuclear war. In other words, under present conditions, it is objectively necessary.

The lessons from the struggle for this judicious political course during the seventies also indicate something else: it is not only necessary but entirely possible. And it is to an analysis of these lessons that this article is devoted. In contrast to other work by Soviet authors[2] dealing with this problem, attention here is given mainly to an evaluation of the place and role of detente in the structure of present-day international relations and in the formation of a lasting and stable peace.

* * *

Detente is the result not of some chance concurrence of circumstances but of the objective course of development in present-day international relations and of the historical process that is being reinforced by the political will of states. Its integral parts are the shifts in the balance of power in the world arena in favor of socialism and in particular in the establishment of military strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO, which is a factor restraining the desire of imperialist and hegemonistic forces; the strengthening of the world socialist system; the stability in the economic growth and social development of the socialist community; the breakup of colonial empires and the increased role of the developing countries; and scientific and technical progress, particularly in the field of developing weapons lethal for all mankind.

The purposeful, peace-loving policy of the Soviet State "opened up" the road to detente. The Peace Program adopted at the CPSU 24th Congress and developed further at the CPSU 25th Congress was timely in pointing out the possibilities that had been opened up for confirming in international relations the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different systems. The Soviet Union was timely in utilizing these possibilities. Along with the Soviet Union,

the countries of the socialist community march in the leading ranks of the warriors of detente. The member countries of the nonalined movement have promoted the affirmation of detente and made a growing contribution to it. No small role has been played by the growing influence of the peace-loving public, in particular the upsurge of antiwar sentiment in the West at the turn of the seventies. Neither is it possible not to note the significant turnabout to realism at that time by the political leaders of the major capitalist countries, many of whom concluded that negoiation on disputed questions and peaceful coexistence are preferable to balancingon the edge of war and confrontation.

Relaxation of tension was initiated in the sphere of bilateral relations. The transfer to this from "cold war" policy was marked in the mid-sixties. And it was quite law-governed that the breakthrough on the "cold war" front occurred in Europe where half the population lives under the conditions of socialism. Development of the process of detente in Europe was largely the result of the agreed peace policy of the Warsaw Pact member states.

The first major country of Europe to set out on the path of detente during the sixties was France. It reveived the foreign policy concepts of the "cold war" and withdrew from the NATO military organization, as a result of which its territory was freed from the presence of NATO forces and military establishments and bases.

In June 1966 during an official visit to the USSR by the French president Charles de Gaulle, the foundation was laid for renewed relations between the two states, which were later reinforced and developed by the purposeful, practical work of the two countries.

The signing in 1971 of the Principles of Cooperation between the USSR and France and the Soviet-French declaration, which organically incorporated the basic elements of the policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, was of paramount significance for improving the political climate in Europe and lessening international tension. The constructive cooperation established between the two countries was extended to both the political and other spheres of interstate relations. The political consultations held regularly at various levels, including summit level, make it possible for the USSR and France to understand each other's positions in order to bring them closer on a certain number of topics under discussion. In many ways the policy of accord and cooperation between the USSR and France becamce the starting point of detente and the restructuring of East-West relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

The shift in relations with the FRG also played an important part in detente. One major event on the international scale was the signing on 12 August 1970 in Moscow of the Agreement between the USSR and the FRG that fixed the inviolability of the existing borders in Europe, including the border between the GDR and the FRG, and also the western border of Poland, and, taking this into account, contained pledges to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force. It was part of a comprehensive accord between the parties that the FRG would also normalize relations with Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Thus was laid one of the cornerstones in the edifice of the relaxation of tension.

Soviet-West German relations were normalized following the entry into force of the 1970 Moscow Treaty. The conclusion in 1971 of the quadripartite agreement that confirmed that West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and cannot be governed by it promoted relaxation of the situation, along with normalization of relations between the GDR and the FRG. On this subject the West German newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU wrote that this agreement "means that finally a practical policy is being pursued under the banner of sane thinking."[3] The joint USSR-FRG declaration of 6 May 1978, which confirmed the will of the two states to pursue a course of detente, also played an important role.

The favorable development of relations between the USSR and Great Britain, Italy, Canada, Japan, Austria, Belgium and other capitalist countries also promoted progress in detente. Traditional good-neighborly ties with Finland were developed and enriched. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal and the upgrading of these relations with Greece were a reflection of the positive changes in the political atmosphere in Europe.

Against a background of broad application of the principles of cooperation in the relations between the USSR and France, the FRG and other capitalist countries, under conditions in which the idea of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems had become steadily filled with specific content and was embracing increasingly extensive fields in interstate ties, the CPSU Central Committee Accountabilility Report to the CPSU 24th Congress contained a proposal to improve relations with the United States.

Influenced by the widespread feelings among their own allies in favor of a restructuring of Soviet-U.S. relations, and recognizing the bankrupt nature of the "cold war," the U.S. leaders were forced to abandon confrontation and to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the basis of equality. During the last decade a number of Soviet-U.S. summit-level meetings took place and L.I. Brezhnev and A.A. Gromyko had a large number of talks with the U.S. Secretary of State in Moscow and with the U.S. President when the USSR Foreign Minister visited Washington and New York. In a short time historically considerable work was done to restructure Soviet-U.S. relations. As a result of these meetings between the USSR and the United States a broad legal-agreement basis was created for a policy of detente.[4] Documents such as the Bases for Mutual Relations between the USSR and the United States (1972), the Treaty between the USSR and the United States To Prevent Nuclear War (1973), the Treaty between the USSR and the United States To Limit Antimissile Systems (1972) and the Interim Agreement between the USSR and the United States on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms (1972) were of special international significance.

It was noted in the CPSU Central Committee Accountability Report to the CPSU 25th Congress that the Soviet-U.S. documents in their entirety had laid a solid political and legal basis for the development of mutually beneficial cooperation between the USSR and the United States on the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated its readiness to pursue the path of detente in relations with the United States. In 1979 a meeting took place in Vienna between

L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the U.S. President, J. Carter. Its results--primarily the signing of a second agreement on limiting strategic arms--SALT II--were called upon to give new impetus to the process of normalizing the international political climate.[5] The Soviet side strove to achieve this goal also at meetings that took place in May and September of 1980 between the USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and the U.S. Secretary of State E. Muskie.

In its turn, detente in relations between the USSR and the United States served as a real stimulus for further restructuring of relations between the USSR and other capitalist states on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation. During the seventies, relations between the socialist and capitalist countries entered a new stage characterized by the establishment of political cooperation between states with opposed social systems, dictated by the interests ofpreventing nuclear missile war and insuring peace, security and international cooperation.

It is extremely characteristic that for the Soviet Union the decisive turn to detente signified a natural development in the consistently pursued course of transforming international relations in accordance with the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, whereas for the political leadership of the capitalist countries, and primarily the United States, it was necessary to make a quite radical reappraisal of its own foreign policy in order to move away from the "cold war" and confrontation with the Soviet Union to negotiation with it. The recognition by the figures who at that time were at the helm of power in the countries of the capitalist world of the futility and senselessness of counting on nuclear force was of decisive significance in the reappraisal of the possible and the attainable. And the fact is that it was not the means of waging war themselves that turned out to be more than enough to achieve foreign policy aims, as some bourgeois researchers try to assert. History proves that imperialism has never hesitated to use force in order to realize its plans. The leadership of the capitalist world came to the idea of the need to reduce the danger of nuclear war as a result of understanding that the other side--the Soviet Union--also possesses the same kind of military power as the nuclear powers in the West, primarily the United States. Speaking at the Council for International Relations in Saint Louis (Missouri) on 12 May 1975,former U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger said that the USSR and the United States "face a problem without historical precedent: each of these powers possesses weapons capable of destroying civilized life. Therefore, no matter how we compete between ourselves and no matter what the ideological oppostion, neither of these powers can attempt to impose its will on the other without taking an unacceptable risk."[6]

Another important conclusion on the need to maintain military strategic balance between the USSR and the United States and between the two military and political alliances in Europe was linked with the recognition of the danger of a mutually destructive nuclear catastrophe. Addressing members of the Southern Conference of the Producers of raw materials and foodstuffs in Birmingham (Alabama) on 14 August 1975, the same H. Kissinger stressed that "never before in history have the weapons of war been so vast, so dangerous, and at the same time so unsuitable for furthering

the achievement of political aims.... We have no task more important than that of maintaining strategic equilibrium since otherwise we threaten our own survival."[7] During the first half of the seventies the U.S. political leadership did not limit itself merely to stating the fact of strategic parity. It reached the rather more long-term conclusion that any attempts to upset this parity cannot be crowned with any substantial, and, more to the point, long-term effect. If parity is upset it will inevitably be reestablished, but at a higher level of weapons system development. The withdrawal of the capitalist states from their earlier foreign policy doctrines and lines was necessitated by the appearance of realistic thinking on the part of a number of the leaders of the Western powers and the of the deepening of the crisis in imperialism's inherently aggressive international policy. It became possible as the result of the change in the world in which we live and as the result of the bold,creative policy of the CPSU, its Central Committee, and the Central Committee Politburo.

The restructuring of bilateral relations between the USSR and other socialist countries and the leading capitalist states on the bases of peaceful coexistence made it possible to move detente to a qualitatively new stage of collective efforts by states to insure security and cooperation. Starting from the mid-sixties the Soviet Union along with the other socialist countries consistently strove for the convocation of an all-European conference.[8] In July 1966 the socialist countries united in the Warsaw Pact Organization came out at a meeting in Bucharest with a program for security and peaceful cooperation in Europe. This program was supported at the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties in Karlovy Vary in April 1967. Specific proposals linked with the preparation and convocation of an all-European forum on security and cooperation were put forward at meetings of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Budapest (1969), Moscow (1970), Berlin (1970) and Prague (1972), and also at sessions of their foreign ministers in Prague (1972), Budapest (1970), Bucharest (1971) and Warsaw (1971). Thanks to the active and agreed actions of the Warsaw Pact countries, questions of insuring security in Europe were placed at the center of European policy and the proposal for the convocation of an all-European conference became the subject of businesslike negotiations.

The initiative and stubborn work to prepare and successfully hold the all-European conference on security and cooperation in Helsinki with the participation of the United States and Canada pertains to the outstanding successes of agreed political actions by the socialist countries in the international arena. Having traversed a long and difficult road, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on 1 August 1975 adopted an historic document ratified by the signatures of the top leaders of 33 European states and also the United States and Canada. In this document, representing collective understanding on a broad range of urgent problems, were recorded, in particular, 10 principles for relations by which all participants pledged themselves to be guided in European affairs.[9] The signing in Helsinki of Final Act of the All-European Conference was a major event affecting the situation not only in Europe but throughout the world. A.A. Gromyko remarked: "The agreements reached at the conference will place relations between the participating countries on the firmer base of the principles of peaceful coexistence and they define specific directions and forms for cooperation in the various spheres of life and lay the foundations for a reliable peace in Europe. Summing up the results of the past,

they specify a broad and precise program for actions by the states on a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral basis for many years, possibly decades, ahead."[10]

The Final Act of the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in its totality is, of course, a compromise representing a balance of the interests of all 35 countries belonging to different socioeconomic systems,but it is a compromise that results from the recognition by the capitalist states of the need to build relations in the modern world on the only possible basis--peaceful coexistence that envisages nonintervention in each other's affairs. The soundness and acceptability of this agreement lie in the fact that it was achieved in the interests of strengthening peace and confirming the rights of peoples to free, independent development and at the same time does not affect the differences in the ideology and social systems of the countries participating in the conference. Assessing the results of the Helsinki forum and in particular the solemn pledge "to expand and deepen the process of detente and make it progressive and stable," the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers noted that "the agreements reached as a result of the conference are in accord with those principles of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation and the peace and freedom of peoples that were worked out by V.I. Lenin and that the Soviet state has defended along the entire path of its history."[11]

As can now be clearly seen, five years after Helsinki the birth of the Final Act has opened up broad prospects forpeaceful development and has served as an impetus for the further advance of the process of detente. What has happened has not been simply mutual supplementation of bilateral and multilateral relations but the extension of cooperation in Europe in all directions. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Helsinki conference, L.I Brezhnev stated: "If we look at the course of European development not through the prism of the moment but in the historical perspective, there is no road back to Helsinki. Like the UN Charter, the Final Act is facilitating the transfer of human civilization to new and higher levels in international relations."[12] The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are consistently following a line to implement the agreements contained in the Final Act, in all their directions. They are striving for recognition of the principles adopted in Helsinki as the laws of international life. In this sphere the Soviet Union has displayed an historic initiative, having included in its constitution all ten principles of the Final Act.

Detente is affecting all aspects of interstate relations in Europe. Political mutual relations between the European socialist and capitalist countries have begun to acquire a new, stable character. Positions on observance of principles in relations between states have been reinforced in agreements and other documents signed in recent years between the Soviet Union and France, the FRG, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, and also between a number of other countries. It has been possible to achieve not insubstantial results in the development of equal trade and economic, scientific and technical and cultural ties between the capitalist and socialist states of Europe. The total volume of trade among them has reached about $60 billion annually (in 1965 the total was only $8.3 billion). New agreements have recently been concluded whose fulfillment will insure further growth in trade.[13] A comprehensive, long-term foundation has been laid under economic cooperation with countries such as France, the FRG and Finland.

Detente has enriched the traditional forms of interstate exchange in Europe and created new ones. Summit-level meetings and conferences have become a powerful accelerator in the positive changes in international relations. Mechanisms for political consultations whose thematic and geographic range is being systematically extended have been firmly introduced into mutual relations between states with different sociopolitical systems.

A useful contribution to the development of cooperation in Europe has been made by multilateral measures on concrete questions agreed upon at the 1978 Belgrade meeting of representatives from the states participating in the Helsinki conference: meetings of experts to work out a generally accepted method for the peaceful settlement of disputes and an all-European scientific forum, together with forums on economic, scientific and technical and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean area. The scientific forum of representatives of these states that took place in 1980 in Hamburg was of positive significance.

The Final Act adopted in Helsinki has become a landmark in European affairs, a kind of yardstick for affirming the relations of peace and cooperation. It has demonstrated graphically that the restructuring of international relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems is not only conceivable in principle but also in the practical implementation of the matter.

Detente, which has demonstrated its viability and that it produces results in Europe, which experienced to the greatest degree all the costs and danger of the "cold war," has been adopted as a purposeful foreign policy position also by the countries of other regions and continents. It has received universal recognition in the United Nations, which in December 1977 adopted on the initiative of the Soviet Union the Declaration on Deepening and Consolidating the Relaxation of International Tension. In this declaration it speaks of the pressing need for detente "to embrace all regions of the world and promote the settlement of unresolved international problems peacefully by means of participation and cooperation among states."[14] In the process of detente--and this, perhaps, is the most important thing--a start has been made on the formation of a system of lasting peace, a peace based not on the balance of terror but on equal security and trust between countries, on the active participation of all states, large and small, in insuring international security and developing mutually beneficial cooperation. Detente has insured a turn away from "cold war" and confrontation toward negotiation and cooperation, and has thus made both the atmosphere and the very essence of international relations more healthy.

The military strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and between the two military-political alliances in Europe became a realistic condition for insuring peace and security. It required much effort on the part of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving forces to make the principle of equality and equal security--an important one in the mutual relations between the USSR and the United States as the two greatest powers--applicable to all states and in employing the principle of not causing detriment to the security of any of the parties.

Their implementation in the practical relations between states with different social systems is a complex problem because of the differences in their political aims and because of the differences in the structure of military organizations, geostrategic situations and so forth. The task arises of eliminating tendencies toward acquiring unilateral advantages at the expense of the security of the other side, and of renouncing aspirations to military superiority and finding the kinds of formulas that would insure mutually acceptable balance of interests. Security, both international and national, and forward movement in the sphere of military relaxation depend largely on how consistently they will be realized. The positions of the sides on the idea of national and international security based on military balance have been brought much closer together on the basis of these principles. Political flexibility in the search for mutually satisfactory, equal solutions has begun to stand in marked contrast to the old principle upheld in the times of world wars and the "cold war"--whatever is good for one side is bad for the other."

Whereas in the past it was considered that security was insured first by the maximum disposition of force, detente has demonstrated that political wisdom lies not in the uncontrolled buildup of arms but in agreement to mutual restraint. The circumstance to which the socialist countries have long been pointing has become particularly obvious: the best road to security is not an arms race but the limitation and reduction of arms. It is stated in the final document of the 24 May-30 June 1978 UN General Assembly special session on disarmament in New York that "The achievement of security is one of the inalienable elements of peace and has always been an aim that answers the deepest yearnings of mankind. From ancient times states have striven to insure security for themselves by means of the possession of arms. It must be recognized that in some circumstances their existe ce has in fact been determined by the fact that they possessed the appropriate means of defense. However, the buildup of arms, especially nuclear arms, is today rather a threat and not a protection for future peoples. The time has therefore come to make an end to the proposition, to ban the use of force in international relations, and to set about finding security through disarmament, that is, by means of a gradual but effective process that will begin with the gradual reduction of the present level of arms."[15]

The prospect of strengthening both general and national security by means of implementing measures limiting the arms of states has been opened up thanks to the results to which the consistent struggle of the Soviet Union for the relaxation of international tension and for greater trust and a higher level of cooperation between states with different social systems has led. The chief achievement of this policy is that it has been possible to really lessen the threat of war and to break the tragic circle when peace was merely a breathing space between world wars.

A start has been made in the process of detente to implementing a whole complex of measures to create the material guarantees of peace. A number of agreements restricting the sphere of the arms race and limiting weapons buildups have been signed and gone into effect: the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,[16] the Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop ent, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction[17] and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military and any other Hostile Use of Means to Affect the Natural Environment.[18]

The first frontiers have been passed on the road to limiting strategic arms and thus curbing the growth of arms in the most dangerous direction. The Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-I) signed in Moscow in 1972 fixed the balance of strategic forces for the USSR and the United States and created definite obstacles against the intensification of their nuclear opposition. The Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-II) signed in Vienna on 18 June 1979 opened up prospects for limiting both the quantitative and qualitative growth of strategic arms; however, its ratification was frozen by the Carter administration. All the most important nuclear powers--the USSR, the United States, Britain and France--are linked by the understandings on preventing the outbreak of accidental, unsanctioned war. For the first time measures of trust such as notification of military exercises and inviting observers to military maneuvers, placed on a basis of international law, are designed to remove suspicion about the military activity of states.

Now discussion concerns the further development and intensification of both political and legal guarantees of peace: rejection of the use of force in international relations, strengthening guarantees of security for the non-nuclear governments, achievement of an agreement among the participants in the all-European conference against a preemptive strike with either nuclear or conventional weapons.

Considered in the historical and political context, all these act signify that new and important criteria and law-governed patterns are being formed in the military sphere of international relations. Another political style has emerged in solving the questions of war and peace.

Detente had produced substantial results in the efforts of states in the direction of preventing and liquidating conflict and crisis situations. It is appropriate to recall that the fourth Israeli-Arab war in October 1973 did not assume threatening proportions and did not entail catastrophic consequences in part because under the conditions of detente it was possible to seek effective means to end it. Having given aid to Egypt and Syria, the victims of Israeli aggression, the Soviet Union made efforts to liquidate this military conflict. Thanks to the combined actions of the USSR and the United States, which were possible under the conditions of detente, it was possible to extinguish a dangerous armed conflict in the Middle East. Speaking in the Indian parliament on 29 November 1973, L.I. Brezhnev remarked that "if the factor of detente, which has appeared in the past two or three years, had not been present, the matter would have been quite different. If the present conflict had occurred in a situation of general international tension and exacerbation of relations, let us say, between the United States and the Soviet Union, the clash in the Middle East could have become much more dangerous and could have assumed proportions threatening universal peace."[19]

Nevertheless, despite the progress made, during the seventies it was not possible to stop the arms race and completely get rid of conflicts and crises. Here it must be borne in mind that in addition to socioeconomic causes for these phenomena, detente itself was still only in the stage of being formed. The further development and deepening of the processes of detente would undoubtedly promote trust between states and accordingly would increase the efficiency of actions undertaken jointly to limit the arms race, strengthen the political guarantees of peace and resolve crisis situations. The Final Act of the All-European Conference, in particular, affects this aspect of the implementation of detente; progress in realizing agreements that have been achieved rests directly on the level of detente.

The same can be said of the global problems of the age, such as eliminating the gap between industrially developed and developing countries, and questions of food and environmental protection. And here detente serves as an essential prerequisite for solving these really important problems that face all mankind. A statement by the Soviet Government on this question says: "An important mutual link exists between the restructuring of international economic relations and the problems of limiting the arms race, disarmament and the strengthening of security, namely, further progress in political and military detente, which is of paramount significance in strengthening universal peace, will at the same time promote the normalisation of the world economic situation. In its turn, progress in the sphere of restructuring international economic relations will contribute to the deepening and expansion of the relaxation of tension."[20] Materialisation of detente has turned out to be a far from easy matter. The CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government have warned that implementation of proclaimed principles and agreements requires from the Soviet Union and all peace-loving countries serious new steps to overcome difficulties and obstacles created by forces that oppose the cause of peace and detente.

From the very start the development of the processes of detente has been taking place in a struggle against those who have attempted to frustrate or at least slow down the restructuring of international relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. This struggle assumed an especially acute nature when, following the working out of the principles of international relations in Europe, its own kind of code for detente, the question of supplementing political detente with military detente came onto the agenda. This kind of course in the development of events was not to the liking of the militarist circles, the rulers of the military-industrial complex in the capitalist countries, primarily in the United States. From the very first steps of detente, other influential forces in the U.S. ruling class have been acting in concord with them against it--many oil monopolies, politicians and officials who have tied their careers to anticommunism and militarism, many of the mass information media and Zionist circles. Having strengthened existing headquarters and created new ones (the American Council for Security, the American Conservative Union, the Committee on the Present Danger, the Coalition for Peace from a Position of Strength), the enemies of detente in the United States, who on the authoritative evidence of the American political figure and historian G. Kennan, "yearn for an arms race like drug addicts," decided, come what may, to upset the military balance that had been created in the world and strive for the United States to achieve a position of superior military force, and for this purpose to set out on the road of inflaming chauvinistic attitudes within the country, and they developed a campaign unprecedented in scale about the so-called "Soviet military threat." At the same time they made demands for a renunciation of political detente. The march toward detente also stimulated the desire of the monopoly bourgeoisie to extricate themselves from the sharpening internal socioeconomic contradictions in capitalist society, having choked by talk about an external threat the growing dissatisfaction of the working masses. Since in fact all the most important means of mass information are in the hands of the enemies of detente, their voice was disproportionately loud relative to the social base that they have.

It is impossible not to see that the influence of rightist forces does not proceed without leaving a trace. Under their influence the leaders of the NATO military bloc, and primarily the United States, set out at the end of the seventies on a course of upsetting the military balance that had been established in the world in their own favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries and to the detriment of international relaxation and security. After the numerous zigzags and oscillations noted during the first two years of the Carter administration, in its foreign policy, oriented from the very start on the establishment of American hegemony in world affairs, the stake was laid on military force. In the spring of 1980 the presidential aide on national security Z. Brzezinski stated: "We should be able to demonstrate our power and show everyone clearly that the United States can use it."[21]

In May 1978, under pressure from the United States, the Washington session of the NATO Council approved a supplemental long-term program for the arms race, oriented on a stable, three-percent increase in real military expenditure by the countries of the bloc. In December 1979 the Brussels session of the NATO Council adopted a resolution, under strong pressure from Washington, to produce and deploy in West Europe a new U.S. nuclear missile means--medium range weapons. It is planned to deploy about 600 Tomahawk and Pershing-2 winged missiles on the territories of the FRG, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. Thus, it is intended to introduce into the nuclear balance a qualitatively new component--supplementing the means available to the U.S. forward bases and the corresponding means of Great Britain and France, already capable of reaching the USSR, with the deployment of the new U.S. missiles. This, naturally, would lead to a change in favor of NATO in the entire strategic situation in Europe, and not only in Europe.

At the same time, in December 1979 President J. Carter announced a 5-year program for the further buildup of the United States' military forces. In this program it was intended to constantly increase military expenditure in real terms by an average of 4.5 percent annually. Provision was made for the expansion and qualitative upgrading of the arsenal of strategic arms, in particular the development of 200 mobile MX ICBM's, development of the Trident submarine system, and of air-to-ground strategic cruise missiles. The 5-year militarist program also envisages a forced buildup in conventional forces, including the U.S. armed forces in NATO and in the Pacific and Indian oceans. A "rapid deployment force" intended for interventionist actions by the United States is being created at a rapid pace for the practical implementation of the so-called "Carter doctrine" with whose aid a U.S. military presence in any part of the world stated to be "in the vital interests" of the United States is justified.

The weapons buildup in the United States has been accompanied by a switch from a strategy accentuating "retaliation" and based on the premise of "complete mutual destruction" to an offensive strategy of counteraction ("compensation") that provides for the possibility of preventive nuclear strikes and the waging of nuclear war with the aid of increasingly refined and accurate kinds of weapons.[22] Published at the beginning of August 1980, Presidential Directive No 59 states that "limited nuclear war" is an instrument for achieving U.S. geopolitical aims and is oriented on the development of a potential for delivering a preemptive strike on military targets in the Soviet Union and thus substantially lowers the threshold for the permissibility of nuclear conflict.[23]

The course toward militarization has also appeared in the approach of the United States and its NATO allies to disarmament talks. The United States has put off ratification of the SALT-II Agreement, broken off talks on the Indian Ocean and deliveries of conventional weapons, and dragged its heels on solving questions on many other negotiations on disarmament. Long before the events in Afghanistan--so confesses B. Blackman, former deputy director of the U.S. Agency for Weapons Control and Disarmament--"the administration's enthusiasm for limiting arms had become, to put it mildly, restrained."[24]

On the basis of hostility to the cause of peace a partnership is being arranged between the aggressive circles of imperialism, primarily the United States, and the Peking hegemonists, who, pursuing their own great-power aims, are trying to frustrate the relaxation of tension, preaching the inevitability of a new world war and making active preparations for it, and laying claim to the territory of neighboring states and organizing provocations against them. Along with intensive material preparation for war, imperialist and hegemonist forces are organizing unprecedented anti-Soviet propaganda campaigns and sharpening the ideological struggle, which is acquiring the nature of ideological sabotage and "psychological warfare." Trying to impose their will on other states, U.S. ruling circles have set out on the road of economic "sanctions" and the curtailment of scientific and technical, cultural and sports links, refusing to make commitments and violating agreements and understandings they have signed. Antisovietism and anticommunism have become an instrument for whipping up the arms race and a weapon in the struggle not only against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, but also against all enemies of war and peace-loving forces, and a means of undermining detente. The result of all this has been a worsening of the international situation that is fraught with serious dangers for the cause of peace.

Trying to justify and camouflage their line aimed at undermining the relaxation of international tension and at the gigantic buildup of arms, aggressive circles in the United States and NATO have recently unleashed an unprecedented antisoviet campaign in connection with the events in Afghanistan. They are trying to present almost as a "threat to international peace" the aid from the Soviet Union, offered at the request of the Afgan Government. When the question is presented in this way, everything is turned on its head. The real threat to peace is somewhere else--in the actions of imperialist forces and in that dangerous trend that in recent years has been visible increasingly clearly in the policy of the United States and the NATO military bloc. Exaggeration of the so-called Afgan question is by no means the only propaganda cover with which aggressive circles are attempting to hide the intensification of militarist activity in NATO and the expansion of its function as a weapon of the imperialist diktat.

The NATO political leadership is now strongly pushing a concept in which they are trying to make the incompatible compatible: detente and an arms buildup. On 12 December 1979 U.S. President J. Carter asserted: "Unremitting American might is the only possible basis for for a broader, truly mutual relaxation of tension that we are trying to achieve in relations with the USSR." And, speaking in the parliament on 10 November 1979, British Prime Minister M. Thatcher stated: "If we want to negotiate on disarmament then we must do it from a position of strength and not from a position of weakness. We must bring our own arms up to strength and modernize them completely."

Behind the thesis that strengthening the West's military potential allegedly does not contradict detente but on the contrary constitutes an essential prerequisite for it lie calculations to insure military superiority and solve international problems from the positions of force.

It is typical that while expatiating on detente, in fact some of the heads of state in NATO not only are not adopting suggestions from the socialist countries aimed at strengthening detente but have themselves not once made any kind of constructive initiative in favor of reducing tension.

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community decisively refute the doctrine of military superiority and as a counterweight to it propose carrying out a gradual reduction in the total level of military opposition and have immediately started to reduce the arms race. Here they stress that in the long term the parallel existence of a reduction in international tension and an arms race is not possible. The arms race leads only to mutual mistrust between peoples and brings to nought what has been achieved by the labor of mankind and hampers or makes impossible the world's comprehensive socioeconomic development.

Detente cannot be consolidated or international security strengthened under conditions of a buildup of weapons of mass destruction. The arms race unleashed by imperialism is increasing many times over the danger of war, in particular of a global nuclear conflict, and makes achievement of the aims of disarmament more remote.[25] This all removes any kind of justification for asserting that the process of detente is compatible with arms stockpiling.

Another circumstance in the interpretation of the policy of detente in the United States is also typical. Whereas earlier in the United States they used to talk unceasingly about it as "a one-way street" of late they do not openly call into question its advantage and usefulness for all countries, but stress something else, namely its indivisibility. Hypocrytically speculating on this thesis, U.S. politicians and ideologists (Z. Brzezinski, P. Nietsche, R. Pipes, A. Ulam) deliberately confuse interstate relations, in which sphere this policy operates, with socioeconomic processes in order, under the pretext of the "indivisibility of detente" to hinder the social shifts taking place in the world. At the practical level, social changes in any given country that are disagreeable for Washington are used to freeze efforts directed at political or military detente.

Of course, detente, like peace, is indivisible. A profound interaction exists between economic, social and political processes taking place in various countries and parts of the world and the general process of developing a world economy and a world policy. This signifies the need not only for following in interstate relations in every continent and every part of the world the generally accepted norms of international law, the UN Charter and other basic documents of the world society, but also for applying in mutual relations with states in other parts those principles and methods that have shown their effectiveness, while, of course, taking into account the specific political situation. In this way, success in the cause of peace in any corner of the globe would become active for all world policy and would stimulate subsequent steps to strengthen international security. At the same time, the Soviet Union constantly stresses that solving the problems of international

security, such as guaranteed peaceful coexistence between states with different systems, not only does not signify a "freeze" in the sociopolitical status quo but on the contrary creates favorable external conditions for each people to exercise its rights to establish the kind of social order and the kinds of internal methods that it considers expedient in order to insure the economic, social and cultural progress of its own country.

While accusing the Soviet Union of allegedly pursuing a policy of "limited" or "selective" detente, the above-mentioned U.S. politicians and ideologists thus turn everything upside down. In fact, from the very first days that it came to power, the Carter administration began to pursue such a policy, setting out on the road of withdrawal from the joint Soviet-U.S. agreements of 1972-1976 and unleashing a new round of the arms race, provoking conflict situations, and organizing numerous antisoviet campaigns. The idea of "limited" or "selective" detente is organically alien to socialist foreign policy which fights for the extension of detente to all spheres of interstate relations and to all parts of the world. As for the concept of "limited" detente mooted by Washington, it has been, in the apt definition of the Bulgarian scientist A. Todorov, "scientifically groundless and politically reactionary." Since it is openly anticommunist and antisoviet, it is also openly utopian, since it attempts to hinder the policy of detente and the world revolutionary process.[26]

One integral part of the interpretation by some U.S. circles of the policy of detente continues to remain the demands for "ideological cooling" as a prerequisite for it.[27] Nothing is more absurd than to make such a demand. The process of detente is taking place at the level of interstate relations and is regulated by appropriate agreements that in no way deal with the differences of views, ideas and ideology stemming from the socioeconomic nature of different states.

It is quite obvious that the various kinds of negotiations that have taken place in official U.S. circles concerning detente are being used for purposes that have nothing in common with real detente. It is not fortuitous that American "rules of behavior" are being suggested as a "code for detente"--rules that offer the United States the opportunity to intervene high-handedly in the internal affairs of other peoples and to impose its will on them.[28] These kinds of negotiations on detente have as their aim the emasculation of the real content of this concept and the conversion of detente into a cover for pursuing a policy of bellicose hegemonism and anticommunism. On this subject, the above-mentioned A. Todorov rightly remarks that those who preach similar views "are acting in essence not for the turnabout of international relations but for the 'turnabout' of socialism onto the road of self-degeneration."[29]

Of course, the policy of detente will not be effective if the generally accepted standards of behavior are not followed, a different content is imparted to it and it is interpreted perversely and obliquely, and if two detentes come out of the concept, one, say, for the West and another for the East. The correct, generally accepted evaluation of the essence of detente largely also predetermines the proper practical policy, while a false evaluation usually leads to erroneous actions.

At the same time there is no need to search for some kind of new rules of behavior, the so-called code for detente about which they are making such a noise in the West. There is already a code for detente. It consists of the very important documents jointly drawn up by the socialist and capitalist countries, primarily the Final Act of the Helsinki conference. And the more consistently they are implemented, the greater the benefit derived by each of the parties that affixed its signature to these documents.

Those U.S. politicians and ideologists who think realistically, with complete justification refute attempts to distort the mutually agreed formulas for the relaxation of international tension.

The authors of the book "Detente or Debacle. Common Sense in US-Soviet Relations" published in 1979--former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee W. Fulbright, American scientists and former ambassadors J. Galbraith and G. Kennan, former presidential aide for science and technology G. Kistiakowski, and congressman G. Aspin--insistently emphasize that detente must "accord fully with existing realities" and be free from extraordinary expectations.[30] In their opinion, detente should be developed taking into account the differences in the sociopolitical systems of the United States and the USSR, which presuppose competition in the most varied spheres, including in the struggle of ideas; but this does not mean that a refusal to protect the vitally important national interests of each of the sides, from which, however, it does not follow that there is a right to intervene in each other's internal affairs. And, finally, detente, as is stressed in the book, does not and cannot mean some kind of "awards system" for "good behavior" and by itself should not be the subject of "political trading." Despite all the attempts of Carter and his most zealous allies to cancel out what has been achieved and return the world to "cold war" times, the edifice of European detente built through the joint efforts of many states demonstrates stability. And the "hawks" across the ocean will not succeed in shaking it, in upsetting the military strategic balance between the world of socialism and the world of captalism.

In the past years the Europeans have learned to cherish what detente has given them, namely the advantages of a peaceful life and economic, scientific and technical and cultural cooperation. Their value is particularly obvious against the background ofthe crises and flare-ups of tension that imperialism along with the Chinese hegemonists has succeeded in causing in other parts of the world. The Europeans do not want tension to be brought across to their continent. In the West European countries there is an expansion and reinforcement of the movement that unites people with differing political views for defending detente, good-neighborly relations and the development of peaceful cooperation with their neighbors in the East. And among statesmen in the West there is a growing understanding of the need to continue the political dialog with the socialist countries and to seek jointly for solutions to existing problems. By no means all of them are prepared to sacrifice the achievements of detente by displaying heroic "loyalty of the Nibelungen" to the United States. Washington's attempt to achieve the virtual isolation of the Soviet Union has suffered obvious failure. The meeting between L.I. Brezhnev, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the President of France V. Giscard d'Estaing in Warsaw in May 1980, and also the talks between USSR and FRG leaders in Moscow in July of the same year promoted an improvement in the international climate. Of fundamental significance is the fact

that at the Moscow talks both sides stated that they consider the relaxation of tension essential, possible and useful, and they expressed their will to act in such a way that it becomes the leading trend in international relations. The political leaders of Finland and Austria have spoken out decisively in favor of maintaining detente as a leading trend. And sober-thinking circles inside the United States itself, who recognize the danger of nuclear war and the whole risk of "war brinkmanship" are also speaking out for the retention of detente. They are sharply criticizing the encouragement of force in U.S. foreign policy, the exacerbation of tension and the curtailment of Soviet-U.S. relations in various spheres. The American international specialist S. Hoffman writes: "The attempts by the United States to solve foreign policy problems by means of a new emphasis on military force are an underestimation of long-term problems and of little use." He stresses that "there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence." In his opinion, cooperation between the USSR and the United States is not only possible because of common interests, primarily in the sphere of preventing war, but also essential, since "the solution to many problems is impossible without at least minimal participation by the USSR."[31]

Speaking out against the "effect of emotional, party and even extremist political campaigns" on U.S. foreign policy, the eminent public figure G. McGovern recalls that the truly vitally important need for the United States is to avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union.[32]

Politicians and ideologists in the West who think realistically rightly see the advantages and benefits of detente in lightening the burden of arms, preventing and eliminating conflict shocks and resolving disputed questions by negotiation. In contrast to the United States and its NATO allies, the USSR and the other socialist countries offer the world not confrontation but cooperation, not "cold" or "hot" war but relaxation and peaceful coexistence, not increased hostility but mutual trust, not an arms race but disarmanent. This has been, is and remains the strategic line of the coordinated foreign policy of the socialist countries, a policy that has been consistently pursued by them.

The CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum expressed the conviction that objective opportunities and public-political forces exist capable of preventing the slide into a new "cold war," and of insuring normal, peaceful cooperation between states with different social systems. The CPSU Central Committee plenum resolution stresses that "the relaxation of tension has put down deep roots in present-day international life and there are realistic preconditions for maintaining it as the dominant trend in world politics."[33]

The lessons of the seventies graphically prove that detente is the only route to stable peace. There is no other road. In order to make this road the highway for the development of international relaions during the eighties it is essential to preserve everything positive that has been done in the past decade. In other words, it is a matter of insuring that the capital of the policy of detente--and it is quite large--is not put into a bank merely to be paid interest at the old rates. The fruits of detente must be multiplied.

A concrete, constructive program of actions to eliminate the threat of a renewal of the "cold war" and to relax international tension and move ahead in the matter of detente was formulated in the May (1980) declaration of the member states of the Warsaw Pact which spoke out decisively for maintaining the military balance that has been established and renouncing attempts to achieve superiority of force.

Under the conditions of the complication of the international situation at the start of the eighties, caused by the actions of imper ist forces and their arms buildup, the Soviet Union has again reaffirmed the exc ..onal importance of taking effective steps to reduce the danger of war, restrain the arms race, and effect disarmament among the other questions on the agenda of world politics. L.I. Brezhev stresses that "no state or people now faces a more important task than that of preventing the imperialist policy of "from a position of strength" from supplanting detente and from preventing the flywheel of the arms race from gathering new and extremely dangerous speed."[34]

The draft resolution "On Certain Urgent Measures To Reduce the Danger of War" introduced by the Soviet Union at the 35th UN General Assembly contains specific proposals whose realization could exert a restraining influence on the growing military threat and would promote a lowering of tension in interstate relations and slow down the arms race.

Another document presented for examination at the 35th UN General Assembly--the Soviet Union's memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for the Guarantee of International Security"--recalls in summary form those proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the interests of achieving success in the struggle to reinforce the foundation of general peace and security.

The specific affairs of the Soviet Union at the moment of exacerbation of the international situation and the growing danger of war graphically prove the seriousness and responsibility with which our country approaches the solution of the cardinal problems of world politics and the maintaining and augmentation of the policy of detente. But, of course, the business of detente is the common affair of all peoples. All who hold dear the interests of peace should undertake unilateral, bilateral and multilateral weighty actions to maintain detente as the main direction in the development of international relations during the eighties.

The results of the November 1980 presidential election in the United States graphically prove the imperilment [komprometatsiya] in the eyes of Americans of the domestic and foreign policies of the J. Carter administration. Whether the new administration will draw from the lessons of the elections the necessary conclusion the near future will show.

The Soviet Union considers that given the mutual desire of the sides it is quite possible to improve Soviet-U.S. relations. In talks with Senator C. Percy on 26 November 1980, L I. Brezhnev stated: "We have not wanted and do not want a deterioration in relations with the United States. Even less do we want thrown away everything positive that has been achieved earlier through joint efforts. The Soviet Union is a supporter of strengthening and developing relations with the United States on a long-term basis."[35] The improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations would give new impetus to the process of detente.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA 23 Mar 1980.

2. A. Belov, V. Petrov. "SSSR-SShA: perestroyka otnosheniy [The USSR and the USSR: A Restructuring of Relations], Moscow 1976; N.I. Levebev. "Novyy etap mezhdunarodnye otnosheniy"[The New Stage in International Relations], Moscow 1976; Ibid. "Velikiy Oktyabr' i perestroyka mezhdunarodnye otnosheniy" [The Great October and the Restructuring of International Relations], Moscow 1978; A.O. Chubar'yan. "Mirnoye sosusheetvovaniye: teoriya i praktika" [Peaceful Coexistence: Theory and Practice], Moscow 1976; K.I. Zarodov. "Sotsializm, mir, revolyutsiya. Nekotorye voprosy teorii i praktiki mezhdunarodnye otnosheniy i massovoy bor'by" [Socialism, Peace, Revolution. Some Questions of the Theory and Practice of International Relations and the Mass Struggle], Moscow 1977; Sh.P. Sanakoyev, N.I. Kapchenko. "O teorii vneshney politiki sotsializma" [On the Theory of the Foreign Policy of Socialism], Moscow 1977, and "Sotsializm i yevropeyskaya bezopasnosti" [Socialism and European Security], Moscow 1977.

3. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 4 November 1971.

4. It is extremely indicative that of the almost 100 treaties and agreements concluded by the USSR since it established diplomatic relations with the United States in 1933, about half were concluded during the period 1972-1976. A. Belov, V. Petrov. op. cit. p 19.

5. "For Peace in the World. The 15-18 June 1979 Vienna Soviet-U.S. Summit Meeting. Documents, speeches and materials" Moscow 1979.

6. Department of State Bulletin, May 1975.

7. Department of State Bulletin, August 1975.

8. See: "Sovetskaya vneshnaya politika i yevropeyskaya bezopasnosti" [Soviet Foreign Policy and European Security], Moscow 1972; Yu.N. Rakhmaninov, G.V. Uranov. "Yevropa: bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestvo" [Europe: Security and Cooperation], Moscow 1974; "Problemy sovremennoy Yevropy. Yevropeyskaya bezopasnosti i tendentsiya razvitiya v Zapadnoy Yevrope" [Problems of Europe Today. European Security and Trends in Developments in West Europe], Moscow 1974; "Yevropeyskaya bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestvo: predposylki, problemy, perspektivy" [European Security and Cooperation: Prerequisites, Problems, Prospects], Moscow 1976; Mezhdunarodno-pravovye formy sotrudnuchestvo gosudarstv v Yevrope" [International Law Forms of Cooperation between the States of Europe], Moscow 1977; Yu.N. Rakhmaninov. "Problema yevropeyskoy bezopasnosti" [The Problem of European Security], Moscow 1979; Yu.B. Kashlev. "Razryadka v Yevrope. Ot Khel'sinki k Madridu" [Detente in Europe. From Helsinki to Madrid], Moscow 1980.

9. "Vo imya mira, bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva. K itogam Soveshchaniya po bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestvo v Yevrope, sostoyavshegosya v Khel'sinki 30 iyulya-1 avgusta 1875 g." [For Peace, Security and Cooperation. On the Results of the 30 July-1 August 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Moscow 1975, pp 17-23.

10. A.A. Gromyko. "Vo imya torzhestva leninskoy vneshney politiki" [For the Triumph of Leninist Foreign Policy], Moscow 1978, p 417.

11. "Ot Khel'sinki do Belgrada. Sovetskiy Sotuz i osushchestvleniye Zaklyuchitel'nogo Akta obshcheyevropeyskogo soveshchaniya. Dokumenty i materialy." [From Helsinki to Belgrade. The Soviet Union and the Implementation of the Final Act of the All-European Conference. Documents and materials], Moscow 1977, pp 15-16.

12. PRAVDA 30 Jul 1980.

13. ZA RUBEZHOM No 31, 1980, p 8.

14. UN Document, Res. /A/32/155.

15. UN Document, Res. /A/S -10/2

16. Signed 11 February 1971, entered into force 18 May 1972. More than 60 states are treaty participants.

17. Signed 10 April 1972, entered into force 26 March 1975. About 80 states are participants.

18. Signed 18 May 1977.

19. L.I. Brezhnev. "Along the Leninist Course." Speeches and Articles. Vol. 4, Moscow, 1972, p 384

20. PRAVDA 5 October 1976.

21. The New York Times, 30 March 1980.

22. A.G. Arbatov. "Bezopasnosti v yadyernyy vek i politika Vashingtona" [Security in the Nuclear Age and Washington's Policy], Moscow 1980, p 266.

23. The New York Times 6,7,8 and 14 August 1980; Washington Post 6 and 14 August 1980; The Christian Science Monitor 11 August 1980.

24. Foreign Affairs, Fall 1980 p 102.

25. As UN Secretary General K. Waldheim noted in his report to the 35th UN General Assembly, "the strategy of disarmament adopted by the special session (of the UN General Assembly in May 1978), which could become a milestone on the road to reducing the burden of arms, has still not been embodied in actual actions and instead there has been a further escalation of the arms race.... Expenditure on arms in the world in 1980 will exceed the stunning figure of $500 billion." (Report of the UN Secretary General on the Work of the Organization. UN Document A/35/1. 10 September 1980 p 16).

26. A.S. Todorov. "Politicheskoto razvedryavane i ideologicheskata borba" [Political Intelligence and the Ideological Struggle], Sofia 1979 p 108.

27. Detente. Edited by G.R. Urban. New York 1979.

28. Time 24 June 1980.

29. A.S. Todorov op. cit.

30. Detente or Debacle. Common Sense in US-Soviet Relations. New York 1979.

31. The New York Review of Books, 1980, Vol 27 No 3 pp 18-24.

32. Foreign Policy Summer 1980.

33. PRAVDA 24 June 1980.

34. PRAVDA 30 August 1980.

35. PRAVDA 27 November 1980.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

LECTURE ON POLITICAL ECONOMICS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 23-25

[Article by Col S. Kostin: "Increase the Might of the Fatherland!"]

[Text] Activities of the CPSU to implement economic policy and fulfill the 10th Five-Year Plan — to aid in the political training of warrant officers [praporshchiki, michmany].

All the sociopolitical life of our country today is permeated by preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress. As they advance toward this outstanding event, communists, all Soviet people, and the fighting men of the Armed Forces are summarizing the results of their work, carefully evaluating achievements, and looking to the future with optimism.

The decisions of the October 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the vivid, profound speech by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in which he presented a thorough analysis of the results of the 10th Five-Year Plan, laid out the challenges for the coming period, and disclosed the prospects for our continued forward movement, have called forth a new surge of effort and energy.

The draft of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th party congress, entitled "Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and the Period until 1990," has been enthusiastically approved by the Soviet people and the fighting men of the Armed Forces. This profoundly scientific, thoroughly developed and substantiated document embodies the Leninist general line of the party and the basic objectives of its economic policy for many years into the future. The material that has been published in the press will help students of political training groups go more deeply into the next topic, which is "The Activities of the CPSU To Implement Economic Policy and Fulfill the 10th Five-Year Plan."

Group leaders must concentrate the attention of warrant officers on the following questions:

1. The basic features of CPSU economic policy in the current phase;

2. The struggle of the party and the Soviet people to carry out the plans for economic development of the country;

3. The significance of the Soviet people's achievements in economic development for building the defensive might of the country and the fighting effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

1. In presenting the first issue, it must be stressed above all that party economic policy defines the directions of economic development, the tasks in the areas of developing productive forces and production relations, and ways and methods of accomplishing them. The supreme goal of party economic policy is optimal satisfaction of the material and nonmaterial needs of the Soviet people. As the 25th CPSU Congress emphasized, this is the objective of our plans and, at the same time, an important prerequisite for continued growth in production and its efficiency.

This direction of CPSU activity was further elaborated at the October 1980 Plenum of the Central Committee, which particularly emphasized that the party has made raising the standard of living of Soviet people the center of its practical work in the economic area. "I think," L. I. Brezhnev remarked in his talk at the Plenum "that this is the most party-minded approach, when emphasis is put on the welfare of the people."

In each stage of development of Soviet society the Communist Party has worked out strategy and tactics of its economic policy which are distinctive to the particular stage.

Economic strategy expresses the long-term orientation of party economic policy. It includes the formulation of fundamental challenges, sets forth long-term goals, and works out the principal lines of activity by the party and people to achieve these goals and perform the planned tasks.

The tactics of economic development involve identifying those forms and methods of planning and managing the economy by which the specific national economic challenges that follow from the strategy can be most efficiently met.

The highest goal of party economic strategy has been and remains steadily raising the material and cultural standard of living of the people.

The essence of party economic policy for the 10th Five-Year Plan and the long term was a continued build-up in the economic might of the country, a broadening fundamental renewal of productive capital, and insuring stable, balanced growth in heavy industry, the foundation of the economy.

The party outlined concrete ways to accomplish these tasks. These were dynamic and proportional development of public production, raising efficiency, accelerating scientific-technical progress, and all possible improvements in the quality of work in all elements of the national economy.

The goal of economic policy and means of achieving it determine the content of the principal challenge of the current five-year plan. As written in the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, "the main challenge of the five-year plan is to consistently carry out the policy of the Communist Party of raising the material and cultural standard of living of the people on the basis of dynamic and proportional development of public production and raising its efficiency, accelerating scientific-technical progress, raising labor productivity, and all possible improvement in the quality of work in all elements of the national economy" ("Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 166).

A key component of our economic strategy is rapid growth in labor productivity and sharply raising the efficiency of all public production. V. I. Lenin concentrated attention on this problem in his day. He said that "labor productivity is ultimately the most important thing for the victory of the new social order" (Lenin, V. I., "Polnoye Sobraniye Sochinenii" [Complete Works], Vol 39, p 21). The significance of labor productivity has risen greatly since then, especially with the growing problem of labor resources. Raising labor productivity is also a key condition for economic support of the country's defensive capability.

The productive capital of our national economy has great potential for raising production efficiency and the quality of output. The key national economic challenge is to realize this potential, to get as much high-quality output as possible from each unit of productive capital. Therefore, the 10th Five-Year Plan became the five-year plan of efficiency and quality.

The five-year plan that is now concluded shows that the development of our society and of the Soviet economy followed a course of consistent implementation of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress.

In his talk at the October 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev observed: "The past years have confirmed the correctness of the economic strategy worked out at the 24th and 25th party congresses. The economic and defense potential of our country has grown significantly. Major advances have been made in development of the entire national economy and solving great and important social problems. In short, the present five-year plan will take a worthy place in the history of the heroic deeds of the Soviet people, who are moving confidently along the path toward communism."

2. The Soviet people are rightly proud of their achievements in carrying out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. Led by the Leninist party they have created our mighty economic and military potential and modern science and culture, and these things provide the foundation for solving the new, more complex problems of building communism.

During the 10th Five-Year Plan our country's economy developed at a stable rate. National income, the general indicator of economic growth, increased significantly. Growth in national income provides a reliable material foundation for improving the well-being of the Soviet people, continued economic growth, and building up the country's defense capability.

During these five years 329 billion rubles more was appropriated from national income for objectives related to the well-being of the Soviet people than was appropriated in the Ninth Five-Year Plan. The real incomes of workers, employees, and kolkhoz members rose. Analysis shows that these incomes double every 15 years in our country. Benefits and privileges paid for by public consumption funds increased. All this, as was observed at the Plenum, broadened the economic base for exercising the constitutional rights of Soviet people to free education, medical care, recreation, and material support in old age. During these five years our people received more than 500 million square meters of housing space. Every family and every Soviet citizen, including the fighting men and veterans of the Armed Forces and those who participated in the Great Patriotic War, enjoy the fruits of the party's constant concern for public well-being.

The rise in public well-being is based on economic growth and building up our production capacities. Socialist industry is developing stably and dynamically. Its great achievements are illustrated by the fact that 717 billion rubles more of industrial output was produced in the five-year plan than in the preceding five-year plan.

Alongside quantitative growth, qualitative changes which are taking place in our industry are becoming increasingly important. The structure of industry is being improved and the technology and organization of production refined. The sectors which determine technical progress in the national economy, that is machine building, chemistry, and the petrochemical industry, are developing at an accelerated rate.

The rate of growth in production of industrial output in our country is substantially higher than in the industrially developed capitalist countries. Thus, in the last 10 years the volume of industrial output in the USSR has doubled, while it took Great Britain 26 years to double industrial output, West Germany 16 years, France 17 years, and the United States 16 years.

The Soviet Union has become the world leader in production of petroleum, coal, pig iron, steel, iron ore, mineral fertilizer, cement, lumber, mainline diesel and electric locomotives, tractors (by total engine power), wool fabrics, leather footwear, domestic refrigerators, granulated sugar (from domestic raw material), animal fats, and so on.

Fuel and energy production is growing continuously at a high rate. The Soviet Union has built the world's largest fuel-energy complex. In the last 15 years the production of electricity and extraction of petroleum has almost doubled. The workers of Western Siberia have made significant advances: during the five-year plan they more than doubled petroleum extraction and increased the extraction of natural gas by 4.3 times.

An enormous volume of capital construction was done in the 10th Five-Year Plan. Total investment was 636 billion rubles. This exceeds capital investment for the Ninth Five-Year Plan by more than 140 billion rubles. The following comparison is interesting. Capital investment for the Ninth Five-Year Plan and the first four years of the 10th Five-Year Plan exceeded all capital investment in the first 50 years of Soviet power. Our country is now first in the world in volume of capital investment, surpassing the

United States and exceeding the total of capital investment in West Germany, England, France, and Italy taken together.

A fundamentally new feature of recent years is the opening and development of territorial production complexes, chiefly in the eastern parts of the country. The most important ones are the West Siberian, Sayan, Kansk-Achinsk, Bratsk-Ust' Ilim, and South Yakut complexes. Construction of the BAM [Baikal-Amur Mainline] is enormously important for the development of these regions. The BAM will not only improve transportation conditions for Siberia and the Far East and reduce the time required to deliver freight to the Pacific Ocean; this railroad line will also link many regions with large deposits of mineral products and make it much easier to exploit them.

The importance of the eastern regions lies in the fact that three-quarters of USSR reserves of coal are concentrated there, as well as 60 percent of hydroenergy and natural gas resources, and more than half of our petroleum reserves. Already today these regions are providing all growth in petroleum and gas extraction and more than 90 percent of the growth in coal extraction.

During the 10th Five-Year Plan the policy of raising production efficiency was consistently implemented. Specifically, labor productivity continued to grow. In 1979 it was 14 percent higher than in 1975. This made it possible during these years to save the labor of 12.5 million people in the national economy and receive three-quarters of the growth in national income. The material-intensiveness of public product has been reduced, which has resulted in a savings of about 10 billion rubles in raw and processed materials, fuel, energy, and the like.

The long-term program of agricultural development worked out by the party is being consistently and steadily implemented. More than 265 billion rubles of the 455 billion rubles invested in agriculture during all the Soviet years came in the Ninth and 10th Five-Year Plans. By the beginning of 1980 the fixed productive capital of agriculture exceeded 220 billion rubles, which was an increase of 2.9 times compared to 1965, while energy capacities had risen 2.5 times. The fleet of agricultural machines was expanded, with greater power, and mineral fertilizers began to be used more widely.

A major step forward has been taken as the result of the development of agricultural production. In the 10th Five-Year Plan the average annual grain harvest exceeded 200 million tons. The working people of Kazakhstan were particularly outstanding. Four times in the five years they sold the state more than 1 billion poods of grain, and thereby overfulfilled the five-year plan. The working people of Krasnodarskiy Kray and Orenburgskaya and Kustanayskaya oblasts achieved great successes, each selling the state more than 1 billion poods of grain in the five years. The cotton-growing republics fulfilled the five-year plan for cotton.

But agriculture still depends significantly on weather conditions. Only two of the five years can be considered comparatively favorable for agriculture. The other three were very difficult, which made it hard to meet full public demand for meat and milk. It was not accidental that the July 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee said that solving the problems of

animal husbandry and meat production were one of the foremost challenges. L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the October 1980 Plenum of the Central Committee again focused attention on the need for a vigorous solution to this problem. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a resolution on preparation of a special food program in order to unify the questions of development of agriculture and the service sectors of industry, procurements, storage, transportation, and processing of agricultural output and the questions of the development of food industry and trade in food products. This agrarian-industrial complex must be planned, financed, and managed as a single integrated unit, insuring good final results.

The fighting men of the Soviet Armed Forces are making a noteworthy contribution to meeting national economic challenges. They take an active part alongside civilian workers in harvesting the crops, in building BAM, and in the construction of various other important economic installations.

The achievements of the Soviet Union in economic and social development are especially impressive against the background of the continuing aggravation of the crisis of contemporary capitalism. In the capitalist countries the number of unemployed is growing, reaching 18 million by official figures. Inflation has risen sharply, and prices for consumer goods and services have gone up accordingly.

3. Implementation of the majestic program of economic and social development outlined by the 25th CPSU Congress is a crucial condition for continuing to build up the defensive might of the Soviet State and the fighting effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The economic potential of the country is growing as the result of implementation of party plans.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that defense of the country depends decisively on the general condition and direction of development of the economy. F. Engels made a well-known statement on this question: "Nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the army and navy. Weapons, personnel, tactics, and strategy depend chiefly on the level of production and means of communication achieved at the given moment" (Engels, F., "Anti-Duering," Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1948, p 156). V. I. Lenin expressed similar ideas many times. He taught that long, serious preparation is essential for wars to defend the socialist homeland. "Without the most serious economic preparation it is impossible to wage a modern war against imperialism," V. I. Lenin warned ("Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy," Vol 35, p 390).

All our historical experience, above all the experience of the Civil and, especially, Great Patriotic wars, has confirmed these statements by the classics of Marxism-Leninism. These statements by the founders of scientific socialism have been the basis of party activity to build up the country's defensive might in all stages of development of the Soviet State. Defense needs have always been considered carefully in carrying out plans for building socialism.

The party and Soviet State continue today to give proper attention to the sectors of the economy that are linked to insuring the country's defense. But, of course, this does not at all signify a retreat from the principle of balanced, proportional development of the country's economy. On the

contrary, this principle is rigorously upheld. The party and state, in solving defense problems, rely on the integrated economic potential of the country that has been built during Soviet years.

Thus, the development of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy fully meet the growing metal needs of defense. Suffice it to say that it takes 50-60 tons of high-grade steel to build just one tank. A large amount of aluminum and many other nonferrous metals is required to produce airplanes and other combat machines. And then, under conditions of contemporary build-up of the armed forces, the amount of military hardware and weapons is constantly growing.

Development of the defense industry is impossible without an adequate amount of electricity. Electricity production is increasing year after year in our country. In modern warfare output from the chemical industry has a growing role. There is no type of weapon today which does not use parts made of plastic, organic glass, and other polymer materials. For example, certain types of airplanes use about 120,000 such parts.

Further development of our fuel-energy base is an exceptionally important factor in building up the country's defense capability. Petroleum is very properly called a strategic raw material.

Agriculture, as a major sector of material production, plays a large part in economic support of the country's defense. Its significance for defense lies in the fact that agricultural raw material is essential to produce a large number of military materials. The enormous importance of the agricultural sector consists in the fact that without food and grain it is impossible to supply the working people who are employed in meeting the needs of the army.

Needless to say, this does not exhaust a description of our economic potential. For example, the sectorial and territorial structure is very important. A great deal has been done in this direction in recent years. Development of the vast regions of Siberia and the Far East has continued on a growing scale and at a growing pace. Programs for establishing territorial-production complexes are being consistently implemented. All this affords additional opportunities to solve such important problems as creating essential reserves and insuring the mobility and survivability of the economy, which is extremely important under contemporary conditions.

Both individual economic sectors and the entire mighty economic potential of the country, all our production capacities, will serve the cause of defending the homeland if necessary. This was stated definitively at the 25th CPSU Congress. After the congress the Soviet Union has given the imperialist circles who nurture plans for building new types of weapons in order to pressure our country numerous warnings that any military challenge has always and will always in the future be responded to in proper fashion. "The economy, science, and engineering of our country," Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, observed, "are capable of building any weapon on which our enemies might lay their hopes."

In concluding the training period, group leaders of political training for warrant officers should focus the students' attention on study and explanation of the documents of the October 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the speech there by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the results of the fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the draft of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th party congress entitled "Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and the Period until 1990."

It is also essential to stress that the new training year will be especially important in the life of our Armed Forces as the year of the 26th CPSU Congress. Pre-Congress socialist competition has developed on a broad scale in the army and navy under the slogan "For high combat readiness and firm military order!" Military personnel must work hard to accomplish the difficult and important missions set down by the USSR Minister of Defense to increase vigilance and combat readiness, strengthen discipline and organization in the units and on ships, and completely perform socialist obligations assumed in honor of the upcoming forum of communists.

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MILITARY DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS IN GSFG

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Bogdanovskiy and Maj V. Zhitarenko, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "In Retaliation for Criticism"]

[Text] The sentence passed by the warrant officer's court of honor in separate battalion X was to request that the superior commander dismiss Warrant Officer G. Tremba from the Armed Forces. The reasons given were poor performance, lack of discipline and disinclination to serve in the army.

Errors are sometimes made in the selection of cadres, of course. The individual "disinclined to serve" however, immediately appealed to the higher political organ to help him remain in the army, to protect his good name....

What had gone wrong? Only a year ago Warrant Officer Tremba was one of the best warrant officers in charge of a subunit. He was repeatedly commended by command, and his photograph was on the unit Honor Board.

In order to understand what happened, we need to return to certain events which occurred six months ago, when the warrant officer wrote a letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. His letter stated that there was an oppressive moral climate among the men, that communist T. Mekhtiyev was rude to his men and did not consider the opinion of the party organization. Following careful verification of the facts, a critical article entitled "The Attitude Toward a Complaint" was published in the newspaper on 19 July of this year. Naturally, the article was discussed. Steps were taken with respect to the guilty parties. Party and service penalties were imposed upon Major Mekhtiyev. At that time he explained to workers with the political organ that he had erred greatly, that he had derived the proper conclusions from what had happened.

Subsequent events proved that he had derived some conclusions... not the kind needed, however.

He did halt his rude treatment of the men and began talking to them politely but coolly. Soon thereafter, however, everyone who had expressed any sort of dissatisfaction with his conduct began to know just how oppressive this sort of politeness can be. Mekhtiyev began with the main "complainant," Warrant Officer

Tremba. Reprimands and strict reprimands began to descend upon him one after another. It was especially bad because the warrant officer was in charge of a company. A picky individual can always find something, if only insignificant derelictions, in this kind of work. If the orderly was not prompt in issuing an order, the warrant officer was to blame. When a soldier wore shoes in need of repair, the comrade warrant officer was given five days of detention. When Major Mekhtiyev felt that a sufficient number of penalties had built up, he turned his subordinate's "file" over to a warrant officer's court of honor, which issued its opinion in plain language: "Dismissal from the army!...."

We were told in the political section that Major Mekhtiyev is a strong-willed, persistent and determined individual. One could perhaps agree with this. It should be added, however, that he is also an extremely egotistical man, that he always thinks first of himself. Major Mekhtiyev took over command of the battalion at a time when it was not in the best of condition and, according to him, he had things in order within a short period of time. In fact, the negative aspects of Mekhtiyev's ego and his lack of restraint were noticeable from the very first. Division command and the political section tried to ignore these "trifles," however: Progress was being made, after all. They gave no thought at all to the atmosphere which Mekhtiyev's methods of working with the men were creating in the collective.

The situation became so bad that after a while there were few individuals bold enough to openly criticize shortcomings or simply to express their opinion at party meetings. The honest people, however, people of principle, remained the same under all the circumstances. Warrant Officers G. Tremba and S. Krasnukhin and Senior Lieutenants S. Kachayev and A. Yatsenko were not able to remain silent about Mekhtiyev's incorrect actions, and this resulted in the newspaper article criticizing him. Mekhtiyev did not bother to select his ways and means of getting even with the men. He treated them all the same: First came penalties, and then they were turned over to the court of honor.

We could see when we visited the unit again that he had things the way he wanted them. No one any longer wanted to interfere in anything. They knew that Mekhtiyev could make the service unbearable and ruin the reputation of anyone of them.

And this explains the position taken by the warrant officer's court of honor, which petitioned for the dismissal of their comrade from the ranks of the Armed Forces. Members of the warrant officer's court of honor N. Kirichenko, V. Avdeyev and A. Zakharov admitted that they simply lacked the courage to express an opinion which did not coincide with what Mekhtiyev wanted.

To be a communist and a supervisor of men involves great responsibility. The party always stresses the political and public importance of that individual's work and demands that he consider the indoctrinational effects of each order and each administrative action. The moral climate in the collective and the activeness in the men as they go about their lives depends greatly, if not entirely, upon the leader's ability to resolve conflicts with fairness and to find ways of communicating and achieving mutual understanding with the men under him. It is the

supervisor who must set an example of principle and a correct attitude toward criticism and signs of wrongdoing. It is not a pleasant thing to be criticized, of course. Principle on the part of a superior, however, consists in being able to receive criticism in the party manner, like Lieutenant Colonel A. Firsov, as an example. He was also involved--and not in the most flattering manner--in the article "The Attitude Toward a Complaint." He was probably upset, of course. The matter did not influence his relationship with the men under him at all, however. Furthermore, he derived the conclusions and became more attentive to the men, and the situation in the unit improved markedly.

Communist Mekhtiyev was not promptly made to answer for "getting even" with the men. Captain A. Rendikov, secretary of the battalion party bureau, silently observed what was going on. "An unprincipled comrade," they called him in the division party section. Perhaps the workers with the political section were right. However, they themselves did not come out of it looking very good.

The battalion was located only a few kilometers from the political section. And since the political section personnel were aware of the situation there, would it have been so very difficult for them to visit the collective causing them concern, thoroughly clarify the entire situation and appraise communist Mekhtiyev's actions from a standpoint of principle? Everything indicates, however, that they contented themselves with responding to the newspaper article by imposing a penalty upon the guilty party.

After the decisions reached by the courts of honor with respect to Warrant Officer Tremba and the other "troublemakers" were rescinded at higher levels, we got to see a document signed by the secretary of the party commission. The report contains the following statement: "Communist Mekhtiyev deserves to be expelled from the CPSU for suppressing criticism." However, this is followed by the reservation that, "taking into account the fact that he intends to make the battalion an excellent unit, etc., etc...," it would best serve the purpose to take less severe steps. Therein lies perhaps one of the reasons why allowances were made for the suppressor of criticism. He could be tolerated, it seems, for the sake of an excellent rating for the unit. But can such things be tolerated?

We happened to be in the unit when the final check was being made. Unfortunately, the battalion had not fulfilled its commitments. Major shortcomings had been detected in the training process. In company 3, which was considered to be one of the best, we came across out-and-out deception. There were grades of four and five in the platoon combat training logs even next to the names of soldiers and sergeants for days on which they happened to be on guard duty or on detail. Many decisions adopted by the battalion party organization to make the communists more active in uniting the military collective and to improve the training process and socialist competition were simply recorded and then forgotten.

A rigid law underlies all of this: We cannot count on good results in the combat training if there is an unhealthy moral climate in the collective. Good results are achieved where the men feel that they are important and demonstrate the best human qualities, where their dignity, principles and efficiency are greatly appreciated, where shortcomings are discussed aloud in the belief that they will be thoroughly eliminated.

Major Mekhtiyev, a communist, who has set out to persecute people for their criticism, apparently does not want to accept this fact.

It would not be inappropriate in connection with the above to recall the following lines from the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the State of Criticism and Self-Criticism in the Tambovskaya Oblast Party Organization": "Resolutely root out suppression of criticism and correct, and if necessary, punish, even to the point of relieving them of their positions, those workers who do not respond correctly to criticism, regard criticism of themselves as undermining of their authority, place their personal egos above public interests and retaliate against the comrades who criticized them."

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SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES

Physical Training Activities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 80 p 4

[Article by M. Shlayen, Southern Group of Forces: "Armor and Muscles"]

[Text] The heavy combat vehicles were en route to the tactical exercise area. Despite swamps, woods and hilly terrain, they were staying strictly on schedule. The headlight beams illuminated the narrow, rocky road, which faded away into the darkness of the night. Toward dawn, when several dozen kilometers of difficult travel lay behind and the tank regiment had arrived at the designated site, Senior Lieutenant V. Chernokozhev, the company commander, received the order to carry out engineer organization of a defensive strong point at once.

The officer knew that the soldiers were thoroughly exhausted, that they had been under great physical and psychological pressure during the trip. Furthermore, it would not be easy to dig the ditches and trenches. The ground was solid limestone. A shove would not do the job, and there was little time. When he assigned the task to the subunit, however, the senior lieutenant did not doubt that the personnel would perform it successfully. His men had good combat training and were physically fit. The subunit had represented its unit in division sports competitions just before the exercise began, easily taking first place, and the tankmen had then taken the championship in the group of forces.

It took the company only a few hours to organize the position and set up the fire system. The skillful actions of the soldiers in defense, and then in an offensive, after they had repelled superior "enemy" forces and switched to an attack and were moving in pursuit to destroy the "enemy" totally, were given a high rating by the superior commander. The name of Private First Class V. Matsola, a gunner, whose name was mentioned most frequently among those performing especially outstandingly, was also one of the best sportsmen in the unit. The soldier would remember this exercise the rest of his life--Vasiliy was accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU right there in the field, at a party meeting.

This regiment was now the best regiment in the formation and one of the outstanding tank units in the group of forces. Not long ago at all, however, the unit did not

have a very good record with respect to physical training. Even its combat training achievements left something to be desired. Far from all of the soldiers were able to meet the rigid standards, and some of them lacked adequate skill in firing and operating a tank.

The poor physical conditioning of the personnel was just about the main cause of their setbacks. And this was a matter of special concern. After all, the level of combat skill in any military specialty depends to a certain degree upon physical conditioning, and this is true of the tankmen.

The communists were the first to sound the alarm. For the first time in many years, the matter of thoroughly improving the quality of physical conditioning and of mass sports work was brought for direct discussion in the party committee. The regiment party committee subsequently returned to this important problem more than once and monitored the situation constantly. One of the meetings dealt specifically with the matter of improving the sports facilities. The communists were right when they said that the facilities needed to be updated and brought closer to the barracks, so that the tankmen could work out on the equipment anytime they had a free moment.

Upon arriving in the unit, Senior Lieutenant A. Sinitenko, the new chief of physical training and sports and a graduate of the Military Institute of Physical Culture, energetically set about the job with the support of command, the sports committee and the party and Komsomol organizations. He spent all his time with the men, encouraging and helping them. He was also demanding of them. During the current training year the athletic center has been practically rebuilt, and much of the equipment does not look the same. The multispan parallel bars, for example, can now accommodate more than one crew at a time, and they are designed to permit the commander to see all of the men and easily monitor their performance of the exercises. Another unusual training device permits the tankmen to develop all of the sets of muscles which they use in their work.

The center stands out for its visual agitation, its decor and bright colors--and these things are also important. They make one want to go up to the equipment and work out.

There were many difficulties, of course. There was concern, for example, about the fact that not all of the platoon commanders were able to conduct physical training classes with methodological competence, as Lieutenant V. Gorelichenko does it, for example. Some of the recent graduates of military schools lacked experience and knowledge, and they had not been adequately prepared to take action and make decisions on their own. At the initiative of the party committee, of Senior Lieutenant D. Imkhovik, a Komsomol activist, and the sports committee, which is headed by Major Ye. Li, frequent classes on instruction methods, demonstration classes and seminars began to be held in the unit. A. Sinitenko received help in conducting these classes by skilled specialists such as Lieutenant S. Makarov, a platoon commander and master of sports. Gradually, the young officers acquired the necessary skills and ability, although we have to admit that hand-to-hand combat techniques have still not been fully mastered by everyone.

The Saturday cross-country races and the Sunday sports festivals and mass competitions involving all the personnel did not catch on immediately. They now enjoy universal popularity, however. The club mobile accompanies the men to all competitions held away from the post. The radio section continuously broadcasts information on the leading athletes and the best subunits in physical training, and publicizes their experience extensively.

The soldiers like especially those sports and exercises which fit in with their jobs and help them to master rapidly and easily the combat training standards set for tankmen. A comprehensive training exercise was introduced in the unit on an experimental basis this training year. It is performed on a sort of 100-meter obstacle course. While the soldiers are negotiating it, they practice protecting themselves against weapons of mass destruction, find and correct a malfunction in a radio set and start up an engine heater. As they complete the course, they practice firing a submachine gun or a pistol. The exercise actually simulates a situation which might occur in an actual battle, and the benefit from these drills is unquestionable. This fact will be demonstrated when we establish specific criteria for judging the preparedness of the personnel.

The young communist Senior Lieutenant A. Sinitenko believes that it is possible to bring the physical training of the tankmen into even greater conformity with their combat training, however. Specifically, experience has shown us that we need to include in their sports training such exercises as digging ditches and trenches followed by grenade tossing, donning gas masks on the move, and certain others, which would make it possible to improve the soldiers' physical qualities as a group, in a drastically changing situation. Or why not end the cross-country race with grenade tossing for distance or at a target, for example? It is not an easy matter to toss a grenade accurately after having covered not just one kilometer, but such situations are not a rarity in combat reality, after all.

Right now, as we wind up the training year, the personnel in this tank regiment are in high spirits: The regiment was the best in the group of forces at the 22d Review of Sports Work in the Ground Forces. Almost all of the soldiers are now VSK [military sports complex] badge holders and rated sportsmen. The tankmen are not planning to rest on their laurels, however. They intend to greet the 26th party congress with new successes.

Problems In Reconnaissance Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Parfenov, Southern Group of Forces: "What Is Lacking In the Training of Scouts"]

[Text] The regimental scouts were clearly not getting anywhere with their firing practice. The machine-gunners had gone to the firing line so many times, for example, but their skill had not improved. Senior Lieutenant A. Kharitinskiy, the subunit commander, did not seem to be very troubled by this, however.

"The machine-gunners are the least of my worries," he said. "I can always pull them up to an excellent rating. Besides, they used to fire well. I do have a problem with the gunner-operators of the infantry combat vehicles. Judge for yourself, though: As of today we have performed only 50 percent of the practice firings specified by the program. Why has this happened? Because we are in the position of a Cinderella.

Let me explain what he meant by this. The subunit has only one BMP [infantry combat vehicle]. The scouts are not permitted to take it to the moving gunnery practice range, because regulations require that there be three vehicles. What is the answer? The motorized riflemen of an adjacent unit sometimes come to the aid of the scouts.

There is a schedule at division headquarters, according to which equipment and the moving target gunnery range are assigned to the BMP gunner-operators twice a month for firing practice. There is a large lack of coordination in the fulfillment of this schedule, however. On the days assigned to the scouts one motorized rifle subunit ordinarily leaves the firing range and another arrives there. The scouts try to fit their practice into the interval between the two. Their success depends mainly upon officer Kharitinskiy's perseverance and enterprise. Adherence to the schedule is not strictly controlled.

This describes the situation with respect to training the gunner-operators to fire the BMP guns. But where and how are these specialists trained to launch PTURS's [antitank guided missiles]?

"This is easier for us," says Senior Lieutenant N. Zolotukhin, a division staff officer. "We schedule camp assemblies for the specialists, where they practice on an electronic simulator."

We received the same sort of completely optimistic answer at the headquarters for the group of forces. But what is the actual situation? Let us assume at the camp assemblies the BMP gunner-operators do perform the total number of practice launchings specified in the program. This takes care of only the quantitative aspect of the problem, however. The qualitative side of the matter clearly suffers. The men unquestionably acquire certain skills at the camp assemblies. But these skills are not retained, because it is a long time before the specialists have access to a simulator again.

I visited another regiment during an exercise, where I spoke with Private First Class A. Zaglada, a BMP gunner-operator, who is about to complete his service.

"Can you destroy a target with a single PTURS"?

Senior Lieutenant S. Nikandrov cut his subordinate off, answering confidently:

"Of course he can"!

The private first class himself openly admitted, however:

"I haven't practiced in more than a year."

Nikandrov was embarrassed and began to make excuses:

"Firing is not the main job of a scout. It is our job to locate and study the enemy.... Besides, we don't have a simulator of our own, and we have no place to practice."

The scouts do have their own specific jobs, of course. Their training should be more well-rounded, however. This fact is sometimes forgotten. Some higher commanders also use the excuse that no simulator is available. It is clearly impossible to assign each reconnaissance subunit its own simulator. There are simulators in the division, however. And division headquarters unquestionably can and must plan their use so that the gunner-operators in the reconnaissance subunits of all units have an opportunity to use them periodically. This is primarily the concern of those individuals responsible for the training of the scouts. At the present time there seems to be little concern about this matter. As an example, Senior Lieutenant Zolotukhin does not even know how many simulators there are in the formation or where they are located.

I also have to comment on officer Nikandrov's statement that it is not absolutely necessary for the scouts to be able to fire and to operate the combat equipment extremely well.

"Our experience in the last war taught us that a scout must learn to perfection how to use various types of weapons and equipment. This includes captured equipment," I was told by Lieutenant General A. Zaytsev, first deputy commander of the Southern Group of Forces, who commanded a reconnaissance company during the Great Patriotic War. "I recall how we unexpectedly encountered a fascist column near Tripoli in 1943. It was too late to notify our forces. But we could not let the column simply go on its way, either. What could we do? We couldn't fire at the armored vehicles with submachine guns, of course. Three captured guns abandoned by the Hitlerites did the job for us. We rapidly set up the guns and struck the fascists with them. The column was thrown into confusion for a few minutes."

"Naturally," the lieutenant general continued, "firing guns is not a goal in itself for scouts. It is sometimes absolutely necessary, however. We must not forget the fact that the ability to handle weapons flawlessly gives a scout courage and makes him confident of victory. Whoever fails to take this into account is making a big mistake. A heavy price is paid for such mistakes in a combat situation."

I think that it would be useful for people other than just the commanders of reconnaissance subunits to understand this opinion expressed by the former front-line soldier. We know that the combined arms commanders in some units consider firing and equipment training to be a secondary matter for scouts. They have their "justification" for doing so. The scouts' ability to fire weapons and operate the equipment is not crucial to the regiment's overall evaluation in the inspections. Furthermore, they are ordinarily inspected by representatives from

superior headquarters, who are mainly interested in the special training. Since this is the case, the commanders feel that they do not need to be so demanding with respect to the classes in these training areas. And they are less demanding in some units. Personnel of the reconnaissance subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Chernik, as an example, did not operate BMPs once during their first two and a half months of summer training. In some places the scouts are the first to be taken away from their classes to perform various fatigue duties.

The reconnaissance training is not universally conducted in this manner. Even the above-mentioned, individual instances are unacceptable, however. Headquarters for the group of forces knows about them and is truly disturbed. This is not enough to rectify the situation, however. It will not improve the training of the regimental scouts. Practical steps are needed, steps aimed at improving the firing and tactical skill of the scouts. It would also obviously be worthwhile to think about making the firing performance of the scouts count more in the overall unit rating during the final inspections. One would assume that this would force the headquarters to deal more substantially with the firing training of the scouts.

The training year is coming to an end. Everyone will have to give an account of what has been accomplished and how well the socialist commitments have been fulfilled. Combat readiness will be the main criterion for summing up the performance of each unit and subunit. And the level of combat readiness is determined by the training of all the armed forces, by the strength of all the elements, just as success in a battle is achieved by the efforts and the smooth interaction of the subunits of all branches of troops. Everyone knows that the main criterion used in the evaluation is readiness for combat, the ability to conduct a battle. This makes it necessary to provide the specialists in all areas, and especially the scouts, with solid, well-rounded training. It is important that this be taken into account when the results of the year's training are summed up.

Field Supply Problems Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen M. Polyakov, deputy commander for rear services of the Southern Group of Forces and rear service chief for the group of forces: "Under Field Conditions--The Rear Service Is a Moral Service"]

[Text] Whatever the circumstances, we know that people always need foods, rest and shelter. All of this has to be provided for military personnel. And it has to be provided under all circumstances. Since the military personnel perform extremely important jobs, disregard for their living conditions cannot be accepted. It is with good reason that concern for the men has been raised to the level of a regulation duty for every commander and chief. It is the professional duty of rear service specialists to provide the necessities of a normal life for the service men.

The truth of this has been confirmed by life itself, by our experience in the Great Patriotic War. For example, I remember very well the things I learned from the truly paternal concern shown for the soldiers, sergeants and officers of our tank regiment by Major V. Podlesnyy, the commander. I was a company commander at that time and when I met the major, his first questions were almost always: "Have the men been fed? Do they have NZ [emergency rations]? Are they getting enough rest"? Only then would we move on to other matters, and, naturally, the concerns of the regimental commander at the front were many. One time, breakfast was not prepared on time in one of the battalions. I can still hear Podlesnyy's stern but justified words to the inefficient mess hall supervisor: "The men are going into battle, and you hold them up and ruin their good morale!...."

The material welfare and living conditions of the servicemen are even more important today. Naturally, good morale and good physical conditioning can compensate to some degree for deficiencies in the lives of fighting men in the field. And personnel should be conditioned to deal with the hardships and deprivations are inevitable in a combat situation. It is far more useful, however, to channel the will of the fighting men exclusively into the effort to achieve victory in a battle. One can hardly expect an efficient combat performance, let us say, from a radio operator who is exhausted even before he starts to work, or accurate firing or skillful operation of a tank from a gunner or a mechanic-operator who have not had enough sleep.

The indoctrinational tasks of commanders and political workers are also furthered by the timely and quality provisioning of the servicemen with everything they need. A conference of leading commanders and political workers in the army and navy on the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces underscored the fact that the accomplishment of social tasks facing them is furthered by the arrangement, the tenor, of army and navy life, which depends in great part on good, well-arranged personal living conditions for the military personnel.

The vast majority of commanders, political workers, supervisors and specialists in the rear services for our group of forces take this approach in providing the servicemen with the necessities of life. The enlisted men are ordinarily housed in comfortable barracks. We have many exemplary mess halls and snackbars for the soldiers. We are developing a system of unit personal service combines. Everything the supply standards call for is given to the men on time, in the full amount and of the proper quality. Naturally, there will always be some shortcomings, even at permanent locations. We need to look into such situations on a specific and individual basis, however.

It is far more difficult to provide normal living conditions for the fighting men in the field. Unfortunately, we still have the units in which the supply situation of the servicemen deteriorates almost as soon as they walk through the gate of the military post--something was forgotten, something else was overlooked. And we can and should judge the competence of those in charge of such matters precisely by how well messing facilities, clothing supply, resting conditions and personal services are arranged for the men as they perform their combat training tasks.

Provisions for the daily life of personnel in motorized rifle regiment X, in which Lieutenant Colonel P. Sviridchuk is deputy commander for rear services, are as good as those in any other unit, for example. As soon as the regiment left on an exercise, however, the personnel immediately encountered a large number of unjustified difficulties in providing for the men. There was a large delay in the preparation of breakfast at the food service unit under Warrant Officer P. Voytov, for example. It took almost three hours to get the food to the subunits.

The poor organization was due to the fact that a large number of the personnel in charge handled their jobs in a formal manner. The regimental commander's decision on setting up the battalion food service points was made in good time and promptly explained to those responsible for implementing it. No one saw to it that the decision was carried out, however. As a result a rear services control point was not set up in the area in which the regiment was concentrated, during the five daylight hours. The chiefs of certain rear services did not know where the battalions and separate companies were located during that time. Is it any wonder, then, that the vehicles designated for hauling the food were not prepared for the job or that at times the cooks simply apportioned the food by visual estimate? Practically all of the cooks began preparing breakfast as they saw fit, and not at the time specified by the commander.

The formalism exhibited in the messing arrangement by certain individuals in charge of such matters in the regiment could not help but have a negative effect upon the performance of certain subunit commanders. Senior Lieutenant A. Grishchuk, for example, decided that the delay in providing breakfast for his men constituted an emergency. The officer ordered that the dry rations be used, without even informing the battalion commander.

It was stated during the critique of the exercise that the shortcomings mentioned above reflected the fact that the regimental commander, his deputy for rear services and certain other officers regarded the matter of providing for the men as something unimportant, a secondary matter. This is an incorrect attitude, it is erroneous. It would be perfectly appropriate at this point to recall the statement by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, to the effect that messing arrangements for personnel on exercises, during field training and on marches should be a matter of special concern. "We must achieve a situation," he said, "in which disruptions in providing hot food during peacetime are an absolutely unacceptable thing."

It is equally important constantly to teach the young commanders, political workers and those in charge of rear services how to skillfully provide the necessities of life for troops in the field. With this in mind the military council for the group of forces has more than once discussed the matters of unit administration and services and immediate rear services control in modern combat. Not long ago a demonstration rear service exercise was conducted for the unit commanders and their deputies. Among other things the exercise covered the practical organization of living conditions for troops in the field. These matters were included in the plans for various assemblies and exercises for officers. It is essential that all these recommendations and instructions be accepted for

absolute implementation on the practical level, that attention to the needs of the men become an essential quality of every commander and chief.

The military council, the rear service headquarters for the group of forces, commanders and political organs are working vigorously to publicize the success of those units and subunits in which the level of support for the lives of the personnel reflect skillful organizational work on the part of those in charge and a high level of training on the part of rear service specialists. Tank regiment X is one such unit. Whatever the circumstances under which the tankmen have to work, they have the opportunity to wash up, to take care of their clothing, to get their rest in comfortable tents and to obtain medical treatment. It would be difficult to imagine a situation which would prevent the regimental food service from providing the men with hot meals three times a day. I once watched a special motor vehicle go from one tank to another, as they waited in a clearing in the woods for the command to attack, and Warrant Officer N. Vechko served hot tea to all the comrades. I am confident that this kind of concern for the men was reflected in their morale prior to the training battle and was at least a small part of the foundation for the coming success of the tankmen.

No matter how busy the tank regiment's commander prior to leaving for the field, he sees to it that arrangements are made for providing the men with the necessities of life. The officer ordinarily attends demonstration exercises for those servicemen who will be responsible for feeding the men, checks to see that the food service points are equipped and staffed, that the required transport equipment is available. The deputy regimental commander for rear services also performs his duties well. As they perform their jobs the rear service specialists are constantly aware that the political workers are thinking of them.

By making this approach to the job the standard for all personnel in charge, we help to make the training process more effective and to insure that the personnel are fit for duty and have good morale. All of this is extremely important to the continued improvement of combat readiness on the part of our units and subunits.

11499
CSO: 1801

COMMENTS ON EAST GERMAN ARMY

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 80 p 6

[Article by V. Verstakov: "Peoples Army"]

[Text] PRAVDA has already told about the service of the Czech, Bulgarian, and Hungarian servicemen. This report is devoted to the National Peoples Army of the GDR.

Twenty years ago, when my father served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, I saw this asphalt strip in the roadside forest, the booth of the bus stop, the white fence, and the gate behind it. I often encountered the men of the regiment of the GDR National Peoples Army [NNA] which was billeted here on the late suburban bus. The soldiers carried wicker baskets tied with colored ribbons and with lemonade, pastries, and candy; embracing on the rear seat, they sang. Dressed on the occasion of leave in their semidress uniform, they appeared to be festive and bright.

I now return to my old address. My father has served his period of service to the country. A monument to the frontline tanker stood far from here, above the Russian Tesa River. I can no longer tell my father how the land on which he fought and burned in the armor and where he served after the war side by side and shoulder to shoulder with the new army of the new Germany looks today.

"I swear: as a soldier of the National Peoples Army always to be ready to defend socialism against all enemies shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army and the armies of the other socialist countries which are allied with us, not sparing my life for the attainment of victory." Handing me the Russian translation of the text of the military oath of the NNA's men the present political deputy of the regiment, Captain Karl-Heinz Sommer, stressed these words when we talked in his office. Sommer and I quickly found a common language--last year the captain completed the Military-Political Academy imeni Lenin--and even common Moscow acquaintances. The first thing he asked of me was to write down the names and addresses of his Soviet teachers, Colonels Yuriy Bukov and Pavl Dem'yashkin so as to give them a "firm military greeting [illegible] the GDR" upon my return.

After pleasant recollections, we again returned to our conversation about the National Peoples Army of the GDR. In the end, we prepared a unique kaleidoscope of its typical features and peculiarities.

Created in March 1956, the NNA inherited the traditions of Kiel's seamen whose uprising became the prologue to the November Revolution of 1918, of the proletarian fighters of Hamburg who, five years later, went out to the barricades under the leadership of the communists to struggle for socialism, and of the traditions of the German anti-fascists.

There are three armed services in the NNA: ground forces, air and air defense forces, and the peoples navy.

Almost 90 percent of the officers and generals are offspring of workers and peasants. The period of instruction in the higher military schools is three years, and future pilots and seamen study for a year more. The "leading" educational institution is the Military Academy imeni Friedrich Engels. It is located in Dresden.

The law on the universal military obligation has existed since 1962.

The system for the recruitment, training, and service of junior commanders is interesting. There are regular army noncommissioned officers and contract noncommissioned officers. Both first finish special schools, but the regular army NCO's serve at least 10 years and the contract NCO's at least 3. Both receive rather high pay and are able to "get accustomed" to service and acquire the necessary skills. By the way, there are also contract officers in the NNA (in contrast to regular army officers) but they are comparatively few.

Decorations which are respected in the army and the country may shine on the breasts of the men of the NNA: the badge "Expert of the NNA," the badge of three degrees of rating, and the badge of the Socialist Youth Union, "For Good Knowledge"--in bronze, silver, and gold. But perhaps the Fourragere of the Expert Marksman is treasured most of all. It recalls an aiguillette and is fastened to the shoulder board and a button of the dress coat--a decoration which is pretty and military in nature!

Among the cultural institutions of the NNA the most picturesque is the Erich Weinert song and dance ensemble. It contains a chorus, ballet, large orchestra, quartet, variety group, and even a cabaret. Not a simple cabaret, but a political one: "Pincers"....

There are many details, peculiarities, and characteristic national features. But the most important feature is also noted in the full "title" of the NNA: the army of the GDR--a peoples army. You feel this more and more deeply, coming in contact with today's servicemen of socialist Germany day after day.

In the regimental cantonment, on the tactical field, or on the rifle range the soldiers and officers of the NNA no longer appeared to me to be festive. The officers are in boots, riding breeches, in greenish-steel colored shirts with turned-down collars. The soldiers--in field uniform, outlined with brown lines, pulled together with cloth belts, and in gray-brown garrison caps.

At first the headquarters and garrison paths struck one by their silence and emptiness. I ask the secretary of the regimental party committee, Lieutenant Colonel Harald Zegler, whether any surprise exercises befell them.

"There was an exercise, and an inspector's check," the answer followed. "They now settled down and we will not take one person from the lessons. They are all in the

classrooms, in the equipment parks, and on the tactical field. From point to point. The schedule is strict. We observe it at any cost. For our period of soldier's service is a year and a half so that time is dear."

The appearance of the military cantonments, on whatever land they may stand, has many common features. Drill field, barracks, equipment parks, warehouse huts, headquarters, physical training grounds, club--all necessary, functionally justified, and therefore similar willy-nilly.

We found a platoon drill lesson on the drill field. Having accomplished the next element, the soldiers returned to the initial position at a run. The commands "Dismissed" and "Fall in" which the noncommissioned officer gave sharply were picked up and repeated by the entire platoon instantaneously, without a pause.

While we were watching the lesson, a company of soldiers in helmets and gasmasks appeared from behind a distant barracks. Heavily beating with their feet, they ran around the drill field. They stopped at the opposite edge and removed the gasmasks. They stepped with a song and fell silent. Again they began to sing--they fell silent. Again and again.... In the pauses I hear the commands of the NCO which are clear to a military person without translation. The gasmasks are donned again, tired, but all together--in step--run.

In the barracks of the motorized rifle battalion I talk with a squad leader, NCO Klaus-Peter Glimn. He is 22 years of age, short, lean, outwardly even slightly feminine. Why did he choose what is far from the most peaceful service?

"Prior to the army, I worked in a shipyard in Rostok. The time came to serve--I made estimates, considered, and consulted with my fiancee. I completed NCO school and I like the service. After the army, I will study in the pedagogical institute and become a history teacher."

Klaus-Peter's confidence is completely justified. An NCO of the NNA who has received good references upon release to the reserve is accepted in the higher educational institutions without examinations.

Glimn showed me his room in the barracks. Four beds, night tables, a table, and cabinets. Contract NCO's live here. Regular army NCO's live separately, in the opposite room.

Glimn's squad is billeted on the same floor. We enter the sleeping quarters; the soldiers instantly jump up from the stools, holding needles, thread, and collar linings in their hands.

"They are preparing to go on detail," Klaus-Peter explains, not hastening to command "At ease."

No, this future history teacher is not so feminine.... He captiously slides his glance over the cots with the flat, rectangular pillows, with blankets in blue blanket covers tucked under the mattresses. He briefly asks about the attitude, about readiness for the detail. Intercourse only using "you," only using rank, but there is no tension; the official distance is simply clearly maintained. And really, why shouldn't it be maintained if the NCO knows more, serves longer, if he has personal contact almost every day with the company commander and even the battalion

commander! Today is no exception. Glimm straightens his garrison cap, tightens his belt even more, and carefully knocks on the door to the office of the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel /Piter Daynert/, with his knuckles. He lets me enter first and asks the lieutenant colonel for permission to continue service--he is on duty in the company.

The battalion commander's office is small, but comfortable: a polished table, several chairs, and in the corner--an aquarium with strange, tiny fish.

"I don't understand anything in fishing," Daynert explains with a smile, "but there is something in aquariums. It's just that at times I do not have enough time...."

I ask the battalion commander where his officers are now.

"They are engaged on their personal plan or are checking the NCO's lessons with the soldiers. And today, I am the battalion duty officer. So I'll be returning home after taps. The others will leave at six PM."

Moving ahead of events, I will say that the officers of the battalion actually left at six. Some of them went home, some stayed for an hour or so in the garrison club room: to look at newspapers and journals or to mingle with their comrades. By the way, not for long: tomorrow, as usual, the official day begins at 0700 hours and they must also sleep.

The battalion political deputy, Manfred Litke, ran into the commander's office for a brief minute. He was hurrying to the regimental tactical field to check the lessons and therefore was dressed in the field uniform which sat on him as if he was poured into it. His appearance was dashing, bellicose. As if to lead the men into an assault now!...

"He led and will lead many more times," the battalion commander commented. "For my political deputy began his service as a platoon leader. I believe that he soon will be a unit commander, too."

Such a change in the service path of an NNA officer is a rule rather than an exception. For example, the regimental political deputy, Sommer, was a battalion commander prior to the academy.

...Yes, the NNA has strong, professionally well trained cadres. But perhaps, most important--the firm conviction of the servicemen of socialist Germany in the rightness of those ideals which they are defending.

Gray-haired Major Heinz Kuhlman, in recalling his little less than 30 years of service, said in a rather muffled voice and with a view as if looking over the past for the first time:

"If you look around, you see how our republic changed and grew. And this is worthy of what I endured and experienced during my 27 years of service."

"We will be an unbreakable link in the Warsaw Pact; we will be combat ready and combat effective so as not to leave even one chance for the enemy. Tell the Soviet people that they can count on us."

This was said by Lieutenant Colonel Piter Daynert, commander of an NNA motorized rifle bat.alion, who is by no means a good judge of aquariums alone....

6367
CSO: 1801

DRAFT AND SERVICE REGULATIONS EXPLAINED

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 24, Dec 80 (signed to press 26 Nov 80) pp 30-31

[Article: "The Serviceman and the Law: The Procedure for the Call-Up and Performance of Active Conscript Military Service"]

[Text] The call-up of citizens for active military service is conducted annually in all places twice a year (in May-June and November-December) on order of the Soviet Minister of Defense.

The law determines a single call-up age for all Soviet citizens--18 years of age attained by the day of call-up. The law of universal military obligation establishes the following periods of service: for soldiers and sergeants of the Soviet Army, coastal units and Naval Aviation, and border and internal troops--two years, and for soldiers and sergeants who have a higher education-- one year six months; for seamen and petty officers of ships, vessels, and coastal units for combat support of the Navy and naval units of the border troops--three years, and for seamen and petty officers who have a higher education--two years. The period of active conscript service is calculated as follows: for those called up in the first half of the year from 1 July of the year of call-up; for those called up in the second half of the year--from 1 January of the year following the year of call-up.

Military ranks are awarded to conscript servicemen with consideration of the level of their military and special training and posts occupied. The ranks of "private" and "seaman" are awarded to all those called up for active military service in the Soviet Army and border and internal troops simultaneously with their enrollment on unit rosters, and to those called up to the Navy--simultaneously with their assignment to the corresponding combat arm. The ranks of "private first class" and "senior seaman" are awarded to those privates and seamen who perform their service duties in an exemplary manner and have good and excellent indices in training and exemplary military discipline under the condition that they are assigned to posts for which the tables of organization provide for the ranks of "private first class" and "senior seaman."

A mandatory condition for awarding the initial sergeant (petty officer) ranks of "junior sergeant" and "second class petty officer" is the passing of tests in accordance with the established program. These ranks are awarded to officer candidates who have completed training subunits when they have been assigned to sergeant (petty officer) posts, and to soldiers and seamen who are performing the duties of sergeants and petty officers and who have successes in training and exemplary military

discipline after they have passed the tests in accordance with the established program. The promotion of sergeants (petty officers) in rank is accomplished only when they are assigned to posts for which the tables of organization envisage higher ranks and, in the established cases, in addition, the presence of a specific period (probation period) of subunit command or stay in the corresponding post is required. The next sergeant (petty officer) military ranks are also awarded to those sergeants and petty officers who are worthy of promotion in rank upon their release to the reserve. Soviet legislation protects the authority of military ranks. A reduction in military rank, just as its revocation, are permitted in exceptional cases and with mandatory observance of the established rules.

The assignment of soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers to a post and a transfer in service are regulated in detail by legal standards in the interests of the most expedient assignment of servicemen and ensuring the proper level of the troops' combat readiness.

The promotion of conscript servicemen in duties depends on the presence of vacant posts and service conformance. Here, preference is granted to those soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers who have a rated classification, are experts of combat and political training, and are irreproachably disciplined.

Service transfers of conscript soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers are strictly restricted, especially transfers from one unit to another. They are accomplished only in connection with organizational measures or for other important reasons.

In accordance with the law conscript soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers may be granted leave: as a reward, for sickness, for family circumstances, and in connection with special conditions of service.

Leave as a reward is granted by decision of the commander of a separate battalion, third-rank ship, and commanders equal to them or higher.

Sick leave is granted to soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers who require it in accordance with the conclusion of a military-medical board.

Leave for family circumstances is granted in cases of serious illness or death of members of the serviceman's family (father, mother, wife, children, brothers, sisters), where a natural disaster has befallen a serviceman's family, and in other exceptional cases where, in the opinion of the military unit commander, the personal presence of the serviceman in the family is actually necessary. Here, the presence of a valid reason must be confirmed by the military commissariat for the place of residence of the serviceman's family or by documents certified to by local organs of authority or a medical institution.

Leaves in connection with special service conditions are established for individual categories of servicemen by order of the Soviet Minister of Defense. Release to the reserve is regular and early. The regular release of soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers is accomplished, as a rule, upon serving out the times for active military service established by the law for universal military obligation. It is accomplished by the command of military units on the basis of an order of the Soviet Minister of Defense at the times established by the Soviet Council of Ministers.

Early release to the reserve is permitted in the following cases: if a military medical board adjudges a serviceman unsuitable for the performance of active military service for reasons of health; if the right to the postponement of call-up arose in accordance with the law of universal military obligation for the serviceman as a result of a change in the family situation during the period of performance of active military service.

Completion of performance of active conscript military service is considered to be the day when the servicemen receive documents from the military unit concerning release to the reserve.

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BASIC MILITARY TRAINING: USE OF RUSSIAN STRESSED

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (Signed to press 10 Nov 80) pp 26-27

[Article by K. Pol'shin, military instructor, secondary school No 3 imeni O. Tymanyan, Kirovakan, Armenian SSR: "Only in Russian"]

[Text] Primary military training in the national schools should be conducted only in Russian. However, some military instructors are trying to teach in the native language, reasoning this by saying that the material is assimilated better. It is as if the comrades forget that after being called to the army their pupils will master military specialties only in Russian.

I would like to present the statement of M. I. Kalinin who devoted so much attention to the indoctrination of the youth and Soviet servicemen. He said: "One cannot get by in the army without the Russian language. Our regulations and manuals are prepared in Russian and battle orders are written and commands are given in it. The Russian language serves for intercourse between all the peoples of the USSR. Russian is the language of V. I. Lenin."

It has become a rule in our national school: all lessons in NVP [primary military training], from formation to the end of the lesson, proceed only in Russian. All notes in the notebooks on primary military training are made in Russian, homework is done, and materials are abstracted in Russian.

Of course, the military instructor cannot cope with the assigned task alone. For example, I receive tremendous assistance from the teachers of the Russian language, R. Muradyan, S. Grigoryan, and O. Davtyan. Together, we organize additional lessons in NVP and the Russian language. The pupils regularly write compositions in Russian on military-patriotic and military subjects and are drilled in the competent writing and pronunciation of difficult military terms. The work of the upper classmen is then discussed collectively, attention being devoted to errors and difficult cases of spelling.

In our school, contests for the best composition in Russian on military-patriotic subjects have also become traditional. The results are summed up by a special panel of judges, and the winners are noted with certificates and diplomas. Youngsters from the seventh and eighth grades also participate in this creative competition in addition to the ninth and tenth graders, which gives them the opportunity to improve their knowledge of the Russian language.

Written work on various sections of NVP is also a good help. It is conducted after the completion of each subject and also at the end of a quarter. The test papers include three questions. Answers are given in Russian and two grades are assigned: for primary military training and for the Russian language. After a check of the monitored work they are turned over to the teachers of Russian. In this way, they learn which mistakes the pupils make most often.

Additional practical and theoretical lessons with each class once a week have great signif'cance for the mastery of primary military training and Russian. Those questions which the pupils understood the poorest are studied on them. Written assignments are accomplished for these lessons (to write several military terms or to answer various questions).

Quizzes and olympiads on primary military training are conducted regularly. The questions which the pupils answer at home in writing are posted ahead of time, and then their content is retold in school. The "Orlenok" and "Zarnitsa" games are also used to improve the knowledge of Russian because the entire "military" part of their programs is worked out by the military instructor in Russian. Moreover, assignments are given to the young army men: describe various military orders, or conduct the operation "The order in your home," "Letter from the front," or "Duty." Reports are prepared in Russian.

All these and other measures are extremely effective and bring tangible results, helping our graduates to master military specialties more rapidly after call-up for active service and to become real soldiers.

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ARMED FORCES

BASIC MILITARY TRAINING

New Methods in Military Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Dec 79 p 2

[Article by Col Ye. Shcherbakov: "From Experiment to Practice"]

[Text] These were unusual lessons. And, the officers' interest in them was exceptionally high. During these lessons--which were being conducted at the course for officers of training units--a new training method developed by Engr-Col V. Nesterenko was being tested. Naturally, Valentine Borisovich was very excited. Everything had already been sort of checked (and more than once!) and tested but, how could you suppress the anxiety when not one or two but dozens of officers, the most experienced teaching specialists, would be judging your work, the new methods you were introducing?

Like an experiment, everything in it had to be by the rules, by the science. A control group (so that a comparison could be made) under the guidance of another teacher was studying the same schematic and functional block diagrams, operating principles and operating methods for the electronic device. The lessons were being conducted according to the conventional method and completely utilizing the time allocated by the syllabus.

So, which of the two methods would demonstrate its advantages? The answer to this question would be provided by a special commission which would test trainees from both groups after the lessons were over.

The creative search for new training procedures was undertaken by Engr-Col Nesterenko four years ago. At that time, Valentin Borisovich had a teaching job; he was a group leader. He consistently implemented everything that helped the trainees gain a better mastery of the special and technical training program.

Good results were obtained from the introduction of technical training aids. Year after year, Valentine Borisovich improved the methods and procedures for using them. But, with the passage of time, it became more and more difficult to improve lesson

efficiency by a more widespread implementation of, for example, elements of programmed learning or additional objective testing equipment. In his opinion, the time had come where maximum saturation of the training process with equipment had occured and it was more and more difficult to achieve better results. Did this mean it was necessary to look for another way?

The engineer-colonel arrived at a firm conviction that one of the major reserves was an increase in trainee activity during lessons. While relying on outstanding training facilities and by continually improving them, he was looking for types of training which would engage the men as much as possible, develop their creative thinking abilities and, at the same time, make it possible for the teacher to gain a better and more objective evaluation of the trainees' knowledge.

At that time, Nesterenko's attention was attracted by the methods of a Donetsk educator, V. Shatalov, methods which he used to teach middle school physics and mathematics. Although these methods required extremely voluminous and painstaking preparations, they stimulated the engineer-colonel's interest by their effectiveness. Judging by the data he saw in periodicals, V. Shatalov's methods made it possible to assimilate difficult material better and in a shorter period of time.

Valentin Borisovich found the time to go to Donetsk and, as the saying goes, learn about the new methods first hand. In January, 1976, he attended a week-long course of lectures given by Viktor Fedorovich Shatalov to middle school physics teachers who wanted to use his experiment.

What are these methods? Briefly, they are based on well-known teaching and psychological principles and progressive teaching procedures combined into a single system. In order to remember a particular piece of information with a probability of 90 percent, it is necessary, as proven by science, to completely repeat the material at least 7 times. Of major importance for in-depth, firm assimilation of the material are a systematic study of it and testing and evaluating the trainee's knowledge. By obtaining an evaluation of his work at each lesson, the student, willingly or not, will be active and this activity, as a rule, increases his interest in his studies.

As far as the speed at which the information is being transmitted is concerned, it significantly increases when both visual and audio channels of perception are used during the lesson. The saying that a picture is worth a thousand words is not without foundation.

In V. Shatalov's system, a large, if not leading, role is played by the so-called supporting outline. It is a sheet of paper with a

collection of key words, numbers, symbols, drawings and graphs which, in a sort of coded form, contain the substance and logic of a presentation, for example, of a two-hour lesson. In other words, the supporting outline is the well thought-out point of the remarks. Engr-Col Nesterenko immediately recognized the merits of V. Shatalov's methods. But, how would novices use it in the army, for example, in training units? After all, there are a lot of special features here. So, he returned to meditation, comparison and experiments.

Nesterenko set about developing supporting outlines to study the air defense artillery system computer. Naturally, he drew them up with consideration for current technical training aids and objective testing equipment and their capabilities. He presented 2 hours worth of material in two 30-35 minute sessions. The first time, he discussed all the items in the supporting outline using specially prepared slides and reproduced them on the blackboard with colored chalk. Then, he hung up a large poster of the supporting outline and repeated the material at a fast clip. The repeat presentation of the material was extremely succinct.

Engr-Col Nesterenko recommends the appropriate reading for the trainees' independent study. Each of them is given a photocopy of the supporting outline. During their independent study, they must analyze the outline, think about the training problems and paraphrase them. At the next lesson, a test is conducted before the new topic is presented. In 10-15 minutes, the trainees reproduce the supporting outline on paper from memory and turn it into the teacher. In addition, each of them immediately receives several grades for oral responses during the lesson.

The engineer-colonel's results from the first experiment were reassuring. There was only one problem--the work involved in transitioning to the new training system. Nevertheless, Nesterenko found followers among his co-workers. One of them was officer G. Ul'kin. He developed supporting outlines to study schematic and functional block diagrams and equipment adjustments in sufficient detail for specialists to repair it. The lessons were very successful. Officer P. Rukavitsin conducted lessons based on the new methods with several groups and achieved outstanding results.

Not everybody immediately recognized the merits of the new methods. During discussion of them at a methods council, officer S. Stalyarov was restrained in his comments. "We should not rush our final conclusions," he thought. "It is necessary to study everything well, dig into it, gather statistics and then make a decision."

Engr-Col Nesterenko convinced him to assess the merits of the new methods in practice. With his inherent reasonable nature and persistence, officer Stalyarov also took up the experiment. He developed supporting outlines and gave a series of lectures to the trainees on special and technical training. This was interesting: his results were even somewhat higher than those of officer P. Rukavitsin, who had been using the new methods for a long time.

How can this difference in the results be explained? As in anything, it turns out that a lot depends upon the instructor's personality and his character, without even mentioning his level of training. Officer Rukavitsin overloaded the supporting outlines with superfluous details, as shown by an analysis of them. Secondary points pushed the main points into the background and it was more difficult to remember them. Not all his supporting outlines were known for evoking conceptual images and this also has an effect on assimilation of the training material.

Subsequently, Rukavitsin corrected these mistakes and began to achieve more noticeable results. He is now serving at another post, a long way from us. Judging by his letters, he is actively promoting the new training methods there. Under Engr-Col Nesterenko's guidance, supporting outlines to study the most difficult military training topics have been developed and are being successfully used. Using these outlines, Capt A. Golenko obtained outstanding results while training cadets in the training unit on engineering disciplines.

Now, the experimental lessons and tests are behind us. The advantages of the new methods are obvious. The study of the computer--which the trainees had no previous knowledge of--required only a third of the time previously allocated for these purposes. The material was assimilated better than under the traditional training methods. His co-workers warmly congratulated Engr-Col Nesterenko on his success.

After that memorable experiment, the ranks of the enthusiasts for the new methods noticeably increased. During the current training year, lessons using them will be conducted in a number of training units for special and technical training. So, the new methods are becoming stronger and being confirmed in practice.

Follow-up Article on New Methods

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col B. Lyapkalo, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Winnings--Time and Quality"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 15 December, 1979 published Col Ye. Shcherbakov's article, "From Experiment to Practice" which briefly presented the principles of Donetsk educator V. Shatalov's method and synthesized the experience from using it in the army. Judging from the responses to the newspaper article, many enthusiasts are engaged in the implementation of progressive methods at training units and military educational institutions and in the

creative development and improvement of procedures considering the capabilities of modern technical aids. They are encountering problems of both an organizational and purely psychological nature. But, these problems are surmountable. This is discussed in the notes published below.

A training classroom has been set up at the training unit which prepares fighting vehicle commanders and maintenance specialists for the electronics equipment of self-propelled air defense guns and other combat equipment. From the outside, it is a normal, one could even say run-of-the-mill, classroom like those in every unit. Neat desks and electric displays along the walls. A projector is attached to a bracket hanging from the ceiling.

An explanation on using the technical aids in the classroom is being given by SrLt V. Perebiynos--a training platoon leader. He organizes the study of the equipment with the cadets based on the new method, in which the leading role is played by pages of supporting symbols. The pages contain a collection of key words, numbers, symbols, figures and charts which represent, in coded form, both the logic of the presentation and the substance of the material for a single lesson.

Is it difficult to conduct a lesson with this method? On the contrary, it is easier. And, most importantly, it is more interesting, comments the senior lieutenant. It is something else that requires a great deal of work--the initial preparations. This primarily requires you to thoroughly analyze the material yourself in order to encode it with extensive supporting symbols. After all, it is necessary to put the information contained in 20-30 pages of technical specifications on a single small sheet. And, in a way that the symbols will be easily remembered and will be a good key for decoding the large volume of information. Without any experience at first, SrLt Perebiynos filled the pages of supporting symbols with too many superfluous details, trying to represent or get down almost every sentence in the specifications somehow. The pages were cumbersome and hard to perceive visually. Engr-Col V. Nesterenko helped him correct these deficiencies. Nesterenko has been successfully introducing the new method for several years now. After consulting with him, SrLt Perebiynos redid many of the supporting pages several times, striving for the most expressiveness.

Then, the colored slides were made up. They are a good support for the lessons. Using the projector, it is possible to show either the entire page of supporting symbols for the topic being presented on the screen at the appropriate time or individual units of them. At the same time, the electric displays consecutively light up the pictures of the systems and units and their locations on the fighting vehicle.

SrLt N. Paleyev conducts lessons with the new method. An experienced teaching specialist, LtCol S. Stolyarov, helped the junior officer develop pages of supporting symbols for technical training.

What does the new training method do? First of all, it significantly reduces specialist training time. Moreover, the material is assimilated significantly better than under traditional training. Let's also point out this advantage: at each lesson, all platoon cadets receive two grades--for their written and oral responses on the previously covered topic. Is it worth mentioning how important it is for a future, junior NCO--who will have to train and teach his subordinates--to acquire skills of briefly and accurately presenting his knowledge as he acquires the knowledge. The new method makes it possible to hone these skills on a daily basis.

In SrLt Paleyev's platoon, I talked to his second in command, Sgt M. Irodov, and a squad leader, JrSgt B. Murenko. They studied under the old method. Then, continuing their service in the training unit, they helped SrLt Paleyev conduct lessons with the pages of supporting symbols.

"Previously, we trainees," said Sgt Irodov, "did not always have time to follow the presentation of new material. The platoon leader was rushed. He had to explain the new topic and worry about whether we were writing anything in our notebooks. Other cadets wrote down what was dictated to them in a mechanical manner; it turned out that they lost the idea and lagged behind the others. But now, nobody writes down anything. Everybody just listens because they all get the supporting symbol pages--the foundation, or it could be said, a detailed work plan for self-study. The new method increases the level of activity both during the lessons and during self-study."

Here is the opinion of V. Ageyev, who graduated from the warrant officers' school this year:

"The new method makes it easier to study difficult material and to understand it. While working on something on my own, I now try to select supporting symbols. And, I remember what I read better than I did before."

The fact that the new method makes it easier to grasp the training material and reduces the reinforcement time during self-study was unanimously attested to by the cadets in Lt Yu. Andrianov's platoon at the warrant officers' school. He conducted lessons using some of the new method's procedures while they were studying radar. Lt Andrianov developed the pages of supporting symbols on his own. I showed some of them to Engr-Col V. Nesterenko. He praised their quality very highly. All of this attests to the fact that the new method can be mastered by any officer who has a good professional training, if he has the desire, of course.

Judging from the responses received by the editors after publication of the article "From Experiment to Practice," enthusiasts of the new method have been implementing it in practically all the Armed Services and components. It is not possible to talk about all the enthusiasts. I would like to single out one of them--Engr-Maj V. Tkachenko. Using the supporting symbol method as a foundation, he combined it with other effective, accelerated training procedures. Moreover, he made skillful use of the capabilities of modern technical training aids and objective testing equipment by combining them into a single system.

Several color training films were shot under Tkachenko's guidance. Due to the animation, the pages of supporting symbols are immediately alive. After the lecturer's presentation of the topic being studied, parts of them appear on the screen, disappear or combine into semantic units. Attracting attention by their dynamics, form and color, they are firmly embedded in the memory.

The equipment in this training classroom, the training method using supporting symbols and the procedures for using technical aids were given a high rating by specialists from higher headquarters. At present, such classrooms are being set up at other units and at some educational institutions.

In conclusion, it is necessary to point out that teachers at higher military educational institutions are also engaged in mastering the new method and testing the effectiveness of its procedures. For example, the Red Banner MSU S. K. Timoshenko Military Chemical Defense Academy started a lecture course based on pages of supporting symbols given by doctor of engineering sciences Engr-Col Ye. Syromolotov as an experiment in October of this year. Engr-Capt 1st Rank Yu. Kuditskiy and Capt 1st Rank E. Yenikeyev, lecturer and candidate of naval sciences, gave interesting, thorough reports on the implementation of this method at a course held at the beginning of this month for directors and teachers at Navy educational institutions. Vice-Adm A. Kosov, deputy Navy CINC for navy educational institutions, gave a positive rating to the results obtained by this method and recommended that the experiment on introducing it be expanded. So, the method is gaining recognition in training units and military educational institutions. Of course, a lot of difficulties and unsolved problems are being encountered in implementing it. Considering the specific capabilities of training facilities, some elements of the method and procedures for using it require creative development, improvement and detailed analysis of the final results. But, in my opinion, the most important thing is indisputable--it is opening up a good opportunity to reduce specialist training time and to improve training quality.

Language Problems in Basic Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by LtCol V. Filatov, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Happy Men"]

[Text] LtCol Valeriy Nikitovich Kotov, training battalion commander, was decorated with an USSR National Defense Order, 3rd degree, and Achievement Medal for his results. He enjoys the reputation of a concerned commander and capable teacher of subordinates. Here are some typical cases from his work with the men.

The sergeant was standing there with such grief in his eyes that Bn CO Kotov was beside himself. But, what had happened as a matter of fact? Nothing--the sergeant came from a training unit to a squad leader billet in the training battalion. The sergeant was suitable for all the jobs, with one hitch--his Russian was bad. How would he command? In another unit, this might not be so important, but here, in a training unit.... No, Sgt Babunashvili definitely was not right for this position. It would be necessary to ship him out. They would find him a position in another unit. This is what the Bn CO told the sergeant--and now, the latter's eyes are filled with grief.

The sergeant slowly, as though he had left the office for a while and was returning, began to put his words into a single, long sentence without periods or commas. This was his story: the sergeant's father, a former machinist at a plant in Kutaisi, was sick, a first-class invalid. He was being treated at a special hospital located in the city where this training battalion was stationed. It was a serious illness; the father lay alone in the ward; there was no one to visit him; their home was far away....

The sergeant finished talking--there were beads of sweat on his forehead and his words were hard as rocks. Did the commander understand? "If I will serve here, then I will be able, when the commander gives me a town pass, to visit my father in the hospital. Everything will be easier for him."

The commander understood the sergeant. He started to run over the names of the men with a teacher's education in his mind. He settled on WO Aleksandr Matveyev and SrLt Sergey Shalavin.

The sergeant stood there and looked at the toes of his boots in dismay. It seemed as though he understood everything himself: really, what kind of commander and teacher would he be without Russian? And, there were no other positions for the sergeant in the training battalion.

The Bn CO ordered WO Matveyev and SrLt Shalavin to report to his office. They reported without delay. The commander began to explain the situation to them. The sergeant tensely hung on each of the Bn CO's words. When it eventually got to him that he was staying, the sergeant's eyes lit up with joy....

Avtondil learned to speak Russian impeccably and he visited his father while he was in the hospital; with time, he brought his squad up to outstanding and transferred to the reserve as a master sergeant. When it was time for Avtondil to transfer to the reserve, it was also time for his brother Badray to enter the army. LtCol Kotov sent a request up the chain of command to send Badray Babunashvili to serve in the training battalion.

The treatment for the former Kutaisi plant machinist was protracted. For months, he was confined to the hospital bed. And, frequently, one of his sons would be beside him: Avtondil or Badray.

The names were changed in this story but the story itself is true.

Pvt Vasiliy Fedorov "turned off" during the lessons--he was sort of sitting there at the desk but wasn't there because his thoughts were far away. They were with Lyusya. The Bn CO noticed this dichotomy; how could he not notice it when the soldier was melting away before his eyes--he was pinched and thin. Kotov was an experienced enough commander to guess where, as the saying goes, the bad winds were blowing from. A standard case: the fiancee was at home and she had either stopped writing or married somebody else....

Then, a letter arrived for Bn CO Kotov. It was from Pvt Fedorov's mother. The letter was long and extremely clear. Vasiliy did have a fiancee at home. But here, the standard case ended; it turned out that the fiancee was waiting for Vasya and Vasya wanted to marry her as soon as possible. But, Vasya's mother did not like Lyusya. The letter asked Commander Kotov not to give Vasya leave under any circumstances so he could not come back and arrange the wedding. She also asked that the commander have a strict talk with her Vasya and forbid him to even think about Lyusya whom she, Vasya's mother, had no use for at all.

Bn CO Kotov himself was not in favor of soldiers getting married before finishing their service time. He had a son himself, the same age as Pvt Fedorov; he was now a freshman at a higher military command school for communications but the situations were similar--the father was telling him to finish school and then get married. The family would be stronger and safer from the very first days--this is what experience teaches.

So, LtCol Kotov invited Pvt Fedorov for the following conversation: Wait he said, a separation is a test of love; if it doesn't last, this means it wasn't love but just friendship.... In any case, there was this argument in reserve: his mother was against it....

But, nothing in this conversation was very useful because somewhere in the middle of it Fedorov raised his eyes to the commander and said: "She is expecting my child...." The Bn CO was silent; he sighed and asked, embarrassed:

"Well, what do you think about it?"

"Everybody is against it and now you are too. What can I...."

The Bn CO sat and looked at the soldier. Later, I asked the Bn CO what he was thinking about then.

"Can you really tell what you are thinking about? I can only say that I have never had two soldiers who are the same. And, the relationship with each of them has always been, as the saying goes, without any precedent--its like this with one and completely different with another...."

The Bn CO gave the soldier a personal wedding gift. He paid the round-trip travelling expenses. And gave him a three-day leave. "No more than three days; if its any more, you will not catch up on your missed training later." And, Vasya rushed to his Lyusya as if on wings.

The soldier returned from his home and the wedding and it seems as though there is not a happier man in the battalion now. He is a model soldier and he is studying in an outstanding manner.

Bn CO Kotov is a communist. There are a lot of communists in this training battalion. But, it is not a matter of numbers but of what they are like. And, in the most important things, they are all very similar to their Bn CO; they follow his example and learn from him. They have the ability to make the men happy and to help each one find himself and find his place in life.

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MAINTENANCE SERVICE DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 81 (signed to press 22 Dec 80) pp 8-9

[Article by Warrant Officer P. Rogozhnikov, senior mechanic: "Periodic Technical Servicing--Excellent"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] A short briefing, obtaining tools--and the aviators of the TECh [technical maintenance unit] are hurrying to the airplane. This is how our work day begins, be it a bright summer sun outside the windows or, as now, a stimulating light frost and a light snow falling.

The technician or mechanic has much to do during periodic technical servicing. This is why the skill of the specialist is valued especially highly in each subunit in addition to purely moral qualities such as conscientiousness and diligence.

There are many true experts of their trade in our TECh which has borne the title of excellent for several years. Among them are high-class specialists Warrant Officers [praporshchik] L. Grigor'yev, Ye. Yedachev, Yu. Gusev, V. Zaytsev, V. Podolyak, and others. In this regard, the number of men who are mastering their specialty to perfection is constantly growing. This is especially noticeable now when socialist competition in honor of the 26th Party Congress has been widely initiated under the slogan, "For a high level of combat readiness and firm military order!"

In being concerned about strengthening the unit's combat readiness, our best specialists are not limiting themselves to deepening their own knowledge alone. /They understand well that only all-around preparedness of all TECh workers provides the opportunity to accomplish the assigned missions in good time/. Therefore, such an important point as assisting young mechanics also appears in the socialist obligations of these aviators.

The fact that the youth needs competent teachers and good tutors is proven by daily practice. Thus, for example, Private K. Syrov was charged with conducting a check of the aileron control system together with the technician, Warrant Officer V. Zaytsev. The operation is not difficult--it is necessary to use an angle gauge to measure the positions of the ailerons which the technician will give from the airplane cockpit. The mechanic seemed to understand his task; however, during the first moments Warrant Officer Zaytsev had doubts about the correctness of the readings being reported to him. From them, it turned out that the control system had been poorly adjusted.

The technician decided to repeat the check, and he made all measurements himself. And he did not err in his personal assumptions: the system was completely in good working order. It turned out not to be difficult to understand what had happened--the mechanic did not take the readings accurately. It was necessary for Warrant Officer Zaytsev to explain to the young specialist patiently that carelessness in work on aviation equipment can lead to the emergence of an emergency situation in the air.

It should be said that the officers and warrant officers willingly share their knowledge and acquired experience with the young soldiers. They are striving to expand their technical horizons and help to master the procedure for checking aviation equipment in the shortest times, that is, to make each of them a highly-qualified specialist. Many of our warrant officers have long proven themselves to be skillful teachers of the youth. They are continuing to accomplish this noble mission even now.

Thus, in assuming pre-congress obligations one of the best technicians, Warrant Officer Ye. Yedachev, decided to assist mechanics--extended-service Junior Sergeant V. Oboznyy and Privates B. Polyakov and I. Chekurishvili--in raising their qualifications to the second-class level. Warrant Officer L. Grigor'yev, also a master, pledged to assist senior mechanic V. Popivnyak to prepare to take the examinations for a first-class rating and mechanic Private G. Antipov to attain the goal of second-class specialist. Both the warrant officers and their wards have already accomplished the obligations which were assumed.

These examples are not isolated. Only recently, the number of technicians and mechanics who have raised their rated qualifications by one degree has increased by 15 percent.

Of course, the growth in rated specialists in the subunit has been attained not only due to the the individual training of the men and the assistance rendered them. This was also furthered by detailed special critiques and quickie exercises, the aviators' participation in the work of the technical study group and, most important, the well-organized systematic lessons with the personnel.

Lessons are conducted in laboratories with the use of posters, diagrams, and technical literature or directly on the materiel. It is difficult to overestimate the effect of the training thanks to such skillful methodologists as, let us say, the group chief and Captain of Technical Service Ye. Kadach.

/The reduction in times and further raising of the quality of periodic technical servicing depend greatly on the aviators' mastery of allied specialties/. Each of us often must not only help a fellow serviceman but, at times, substitute for him. And this cannot be done without mastering an allied work sector. Therefore, the men regularly supplement their knowledge and acquire additional skills in the maintenance and repair of equipment.

Once again, our masters set the tone in this important matter. Thus, Warrant Officer Yedachev studied the entire airplane long ago. Senior mechanic Warrant Officer V. Titov is also one of the most competent specialists and, when necessary, can replace any comrade in the group. In the absence of the technician of the PTO [expansion unknown] group senior mechanic Warrant Officer N. Yermenkin successfully copes with his duties.

/Our rationalizers are also solving the problem of a further rise in the quality of equipment servicing and mobility of the subunit to a certain degree/. Their labor is especially indispensable in equipping the laboratories, improving the work sites, and in making special complexes of testing and monitoring equipment, which is extremely important in servicing equipment at alternate airfields. The mobile containers with the carefully thought-out content of instruments which they have created permit reducing three- to four-fold the time to check the majority of the airplane's systems and assemblies.

Rationalizer work is becoming a vital requirement of the aviators more and more. But, most likely, thanks to the enthusiasm of officers A. Shovkoplyas and R. Usmanov, Warrant Officers N. Yeremenkin and V. Umnikov, and others, our TECh long ago became one of the leading creative collectives which is making a notable contribution to raising the unit's combat readiness.

In going to meet the 26th Congress of their party, the aviators are sparing no effort as they strive to service and repair the combat aircraft in the shortest times and with the highest quality. We understand well that the peaceful sky of our motherland must be reliably defended. And this means that tomorrow we must labor better than today and do more than our immediate official duties require.

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MOTORIZED-RIFLE UNIT TRAINING

Motorized Rifle Battalion Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Oct 80 p 1

[Article by Gds Sr Lt I. Kushelev, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "The Battalion Takes an Examination"]

[Text] A motorized rifle battalion under the command of Guards Major A. Ternavskiy was on a march. Together with other subunits of the regimental first echelon, it was to make an assault crossing of a wide water obstacle from the march.

The march took place at night. The darkness hindered orientation and column control. Despite this, the battalion commander confidently led his subordinates to the planned position. Experience had an effect: he, just as other officers of the Guards Motorized Rifle Proletarian Moscow-Minsk Division, had to operate under such conditions many times. From the first days of the training year, here they set their course for improving the field training of the personnel. The obligations of the motorized riflemen, tankers, and artillerymen--representatives of all the combat arms which make up the large unit--were directed toward this. And here the battalion is taking the examination.

The terrain reconnaissance data in the area of the assault crossing were not pleasing. The swampy bottomland on the opposite bank of the river, framed by a ridge of hills and scrub forest, was a serious obstacle for the armored personnel carriers. Moreover, the approaches to the river and its surface were easily taken under fire from the direction of the "enemy." Of course, it could be hoped that the battalion would be supported by the fire of the artillery, tanks, antitank weapons, and helicopter gunships. Other motorized rifle subunits of the regiment were hurrying toward the water obstacle over parallel routes.... And Guards Major Ternavskiy hoped. But he understood nevertheless: it would be difficult to break through to the hills on the opposite bank. Little would be attained by a frontal assault; other ways must be found. Maybe a landing force could be landed....

The battalion commander did not know that a decision had already been made in headquarters: to support the assault crossing of the water obstacle, a tactical airborne assault force would be landed on the main direction.

The order received by Guards Major Ternavskiy on the march was brief: "Departure area... Flight zone... Landing area...." Glancing at the map, the officer smiled--the

motorized riflemen were to land in the area of the very hills which he considered the key to the "enemy's" defense.

And here the missions and questions of coordination are refined on the march. A portion of the battalion continues movement in the former direction. The other part headed by the battalion commander turns to the side--to the place where rotary-winged aircraft are awaiting the motorized riflemen. At these moments, especially much depends on the smoothness in the work of the battalion commander, the chief of staff, and of all officers, and on their ability to reorganize themselves in conformance with the changed situation and new missions. And the officers demonstrate high skill. The decision was adopted efficiently and the calculation was performed for embarking in the helicopters. In short, it was evident that the unexpected special situation caught no one unawares. And this is proper: in the unit where Guards Major Ternavskiy serves, the most fixed attention is devoted to training the officers under difficult conditions in the course of officer training. Tactical quickie exercises and group exercises organized in the officer training system here, as a rule, take place in a situation which approximates one of combat.

Among the aviators, everything is also ready to receive the landing force. This is not the first time that Guards Major Ternavskiy and the commander of the helicopter squadron, first-class military pilot Lieutenant Colonel A. Bashmakov, had to coordinate in a training battle. Now, too, the motorized riflemen and the aviators are working harmoniously and smoothly. Refining once more the procedure for coordination in flight and during the landing, the subunit commanders sit in the helicopter. In flight, the battalion and squadron commanders are in the same helicopter.

"We are now thick as thieves," Lieutenant Colonel Bashmakov smiles as he glances into the clattering, gloomy sky.

But the main events are unfolding in the landing zone. Dismounting, the motorized riflemen rushed into the assault immediately. However, the "enemy" was also on the alert. Counterattacking one of the battalion's companies in the flank, he tried to overrun the combat formation of the landing force. To repel a counterattack by fire from in place means losing time and giving the "enemy" the opportunity to regroup his forces. Guards Major Ternavskiy could not permit this: for the subunits attacking from the front should begin the assault crossing from moment to moment. And the battalion commander makes the decision to call for the fire of the regimental artillery. A solid wall of bursts arises in front of the counterattackers. Receiving exact coordinates, the artillerymen cut the "enemy" infantry off from the tanks by accurate fire. The counterattack in the flank failed. The motorized riflemen broke through to the river.

The assault crossing began exactly at the designated time. The Guardsmen operated audaciously, decisively, and in a frontline manner at this stage of the exercise as they demonstrated in practice their loyalty to the heroic traditions of their brother soldiers. One of them--Hero of the Soviet Union Guards Junior Sergeant Turgun Akhmedov--is entered forever in the regimental roster. He was a machinegunner. And today each motorized rifleman is his equal.

In particular, an important direction in the pre-congress competition in the regiment, just as in the division as a whole, is the struggle for accurate shooting. To shoot excellently day as well as night, in any weather, to hit the target with the first round or first burst--this is considered to be a matter of honor for every Guardsman.

Bristling with fire, the armored personnel carriers approach the bank where the tactical air-mobile force is fighting while almost encircled. They must hurry. But the rapid river hinders the vehicles' movement, carrying them away from the tiny foothold on the opposite bank which had been captured from the "enemy." And here a new special situation follows: one of the armored personnel carriers broke down. Literally meters to the bank.... What will be the officer's decision?

The officer on whom the outcome of the battle now greatly depended proved to be the deputy company commander for political affairs, Guards Lieutenant N. Konoda. A recent school graduate, perhaps he still had not delved into all the fine points of service well, but he had mastered one thing firmly: the best form of political work in a combat situation is personal example. The officer made the only correct decision in the situation which had developed: a dismounted attack. Being the first to rush into the water, the political officer carried his subordinates along behind him.

...When the first wave of armored vehicles approached the opposite bank the battle again thundered on the hill toward which the "enemy," who had been stunned by the motorized riflemen's boldness, streamed back.

The battalion passed the difficult test and placed a serious claim for the successful completion of the training year.

Tactical Training Exercise Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 81 p 1

[Article by Capt P. Morenko: "With Surprise Fire"]

[Text] Utilizing the folds in the terrain which slowed down the motorized riflemen's rate of attack, the "enemy" regrouped his forces and undertook a maneuver to take them in the flank. But the path for his tanks was blocked by the artillerymen under the command of Senior Lieutenant Yu. Ryzhakov.

Analyzing the tactical situation, the officer was able to foresee the "enemy's" actions and he deployed the battery for direct fire ahead of time. Thanks to good camouflage, the fire of the antitankmen proved to be a surprise and highly effective. The subunit was awarded an excellent grade.

Senior Lieutenant Ryzhakov operates competently and with initiative on exercises. To a great extent, these qualities were inculcated in him by his father, Colonel V. Ryzhakov. He constantly transmits his wealth of combat experience to his son and teaches him to employ it actively in practice.

Mountain Reconnaissance Exercise

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 81 (signed to press 22 Dec 80) p 6

[Article by Col D. Gavrilov: "In a Separate Reconnaissance Patrol"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] As a rule, reconnaissance in the mountains is conducted by the same methods as under normal conditions. However, /the special features of mountain relief and climate conditions exert a specific influence on the conduct of reconnaissance/.

A limited number of roads, the presence of forests, the large number of almost impassable terrain sectors and various obstacles, frequent mountain fog, sharp temperature drops, difficulties in orienting in the mountains--all this restricts the maneuver and complicates the actions of the scouts.

The composition of reconnaissance elements depends on the nature of the assigned missions and the special features of the relief. As a rule, a squad or platoon are detailed for reconnaissance on terrain which is almost impassable. /In mobile forms of combat the greatest effect is provided by the use of separate reconnaissance patrols/. We will show this using an example.

...At the end of the first day of the "battle" in the mountains a motorized rifle battalion received the mission to move out to a pass, destroy the "enemy," and prevent the passage of his reserves through the pass to the flanks of the troops which were advancing along the valley.

The battalion commander sent out a separate reconnaissance patrol (ORD)--a motorized rifle platoon under the command of Warrant Officer [praporshchik] F. Bugayev--with the mission to scout for the most convenient and safest route to reach the pass and to determine the forces, composition, and nature of the actions by the "enemy" who was defending the pass and the disposition of his weapons and engineer obstacles.

/The ORD moved out to the closest approaches to the pass at the maximum possible speed. The combat vehicle commanders made skillful use of the natural cover encountered en route. In the zone of a possible encounter with the "enemy," the reconnaissance patrol moved by bounds from one turn to another. A patrol squad moved ahead one or two turns (Fig. 1) [not reproduced]. Thorough all-around observation was organized in all BMP's [infantry combat vehicle]/.

After each turn, the commander of the patrol squad attentively inspected the terrain through his binoculars both forward along the route as well as upward and to the sides. After the inspection of the terrain, the commander of the patrol squad selected suitable cover ahead and, with permission of the ORD commander, the squad executed the next bound while the main nucleus of the patrol moved out to its place.

The reconnaissance patrol discovered the forward "enemy" subunit on a hill located directly at the pass. Warrant Officer Bugayev moved out to the position of the patrol squad, studied the terrain, then summoned the squad leaders, and indicated to them on the ground reference points which are easily distinguishable in the nighttime as well (twilight was approaching), the directions for the squads to conduct reconnaissance, azimuths of movement, the procedure for using night vision instruments, and signals for warning and to indicate location.

/On the decision of the ORD commander the platoon squad continued to conduct reconnaissance of the "enemy" to the front while the other two squads were to move out covertly to the slopes of the nearest hills and, from there, to conduct reconnaissance of the defenders' rear and flanks (Fig. 2)/ [not reproduced].

Making an estimate of the situation which had developed, the warrant officer understood that it would hardly be possible to disclose the "enemy's" defense and fire system without a reconnaissance in force. Therefore, reporting to the battalion commander about the route which had been reconnoitered and the approach to the pass, the warrant officer also reported his decision for a reconnaissance in force. Receiving "Good," Bugayev defined the missions in detail for the squads and, after they reached the planned positions, he conducted a feint attack of the "enemy's" defense with the squad which was operating up front. The latter opened fire from all weapons which it had at its disposal. The scouts not only intersected the location of the weapon emplacements, but also captured a prisoner.

The "enemy's" defense in the pass was disclosed. Knowing the battalion commander's general concept, Warrant Officer Bugayev indicated to the squads which were conducting reconnaissance in the rear places to establish ambushes on the most probable "enemy" routes of withdrawal from the pass.

The battalion main body soon approached the pass. Using scout-guides from the ORD squads which had already executed a flanking movement, two companies reached the rear of the "enemy's" defense and prepared for an assault. After execution of the maneuver, the battalion commander gave the signal for the assault: one company attacked from the front, and the other two-- from the flank and rear. The simultaneous attack led to rapid success. Landing in a killing ground, the defenders of the hill began to withdraw, suffering large losses. The remnants of the withdrawing "enemy" forces came under fire from the ambushes which had been set out by Warrant Officer Bugayev skillfully and in good time.

The mission was accomplished: the pass was in the hands of the battalion and the possible emergence of "enemy" reserves in the flank of the attacking troops was prevented. The battalion's success was greatly furthered by the initiative and skillful actions on reconnaissance by the motorized rifle platoon commanded by Warrant Officer Bugayev.

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TRAINING IN TANK SUBUNITS DESCRIBED

Tank Subunit Tactical Training Discussed

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 81 (signed to press 22 Dec 80) pp 3-4

[Article by Col Ye. Chernyshev, senior officer of Main Combat Training Directorate, Ground Forces: "Check Area"]

[Text] Recently, in their searches for ways to increase the intensity of lessons in combat training leading commanders are turning to various methods for their integration. This is furthered by new programs with broad possibilities contained in them for the creative employment of leading methods and procedures for training the men.

The program for the combat training of training tank subunits envisages lessons for future tank commanders on a check area of a tactical training field (integrated tactical area). Graduation examinations show that the students who have gone through two or three such lessons acquire practical skills in commanding a tank in battle and are distinguished by confidence and clarity of actions.

Broad Possibilities

The area includes training objects for tactical, gunnery, reconnaissance and engineering training, for defense against weapons of mass destruction, and other training subjects. Therefore, it is very accurately called integrated. The training objects on it are located not far from one another in a circle. This permits saving training time and permits the trainees to operate dynamically and purposefully and to master tactical and gunnery training rapidly.

Prior to the completion of the training program the integration of lessons has a limited nature. Integrated lessons are conducted after assimilation of the basic subjects in tactical and gunnery training and other subjects of instruction. On them, the future tank commanders control the crews under conditions of the change from one type of battle to another and a rapid change in the situation, they accomplish special situations and suddenly arising missions, and they improve their tactical training in organic unity with gunnery training.

The integrated tactical area (see diagram) includes the following equipped training objects: attack position (problems in the organization of battle are worked out

here), enemy platoon strong point saturated with a controlled target situation (negotiating engineer obstacles, attack of the enemy FEBA [forward edge of the battle area], destruction of his personnel and weapons, fire control); a center of resistance in the depth of the defense (execution of maneuvers with emergence on the flanks, coordination between tanks, fire control); targets to simulate a counterattack; terrain sectors which permit studying the procedure for pursuing the enemy; mined obstructions; a designated zone of contamination (crossing with the use of individual protective equipment, partial special processing); sectors for operations as patrol tanks, reconnaissance of a ford across a water obstacle, determining the trafficability of a bridge, a platoon strong point.

Let us examine one of the lessons or an integrated tactical area which was conducted by the best methodologist of the unit, platoon leader Lieutenant V. Terekhov. The following training problems were worked out on it: moving out and attacking the enemy FEBA with the crossing of engineer obstacles; executing a maneuver during battle in the depth; repelling counterattacks from in place; pursuit; actions in a reconnaissance patrol; march at maximum speed; assumption of the defense and its conduct.

Allocated for the lesson were three tanks, one APC [armored personnel carrier] for the director, and a cargo vehicle to transport the personnel.

The goal of the lesson was to give the students practice in controlling a tank in battle.

Each trainee was to act in the role of tank commander for 25 minutes and in the role of gunner and loader for the same amount of time.

The platoon leader, Lieutenant Terekhov, resolved a major part of the questions in organizing the lesson on the eve during hours for self-study. He briefed the sergeants directly on the area, led them into the tactical situation, assigned missions and issued his combat order for the attack, and established the sequence for the changing of training squads on the area. All this permitted a considerable savings of training time allotted by the program for an integrated lesson (4 hours) on the day of the lessons.

And here are the tanker-students in the field. The first squad, commanded by Sergeant K. Semenov, received combat vehicles and conducted the check inspection. The second, under the command of Junior Sergeant K. Dymov, began the integrated lessons without materiel. The third, where the commander was Junior Sergeant N. Katkov, prepared to operate as the "enemy."

The platoon leader who was on the armored personnel carrier entered into radio communications with the tanks and assigned the missions to the crews. Sergeant Semenov (he conducted a tactical and marching drill lesson without the materiel on the eve) was located together with the platoon leader on the APC and prepared to analyze the actions of the trainees.

Under Conditions Which Approximate Those of Combat

On the platoon leader's signal, the tanks began to move out in a column toward the line for launching the assault. Here, the officer issued commands to change the

vehicles' speed of movement and the distances between them. The tanks quickly deployed into an assault line formation; however, they soon strayed from the direction of the assault. Because of the limited time, the platoon leader did not begin to repeat the trainees' actions again. He corrected the status of the combat formation by issuing the corresponding commands. Next, he indicated to each crew the place of the passage in a minefield. The combat vehicles took off in their directions. At this time, targets were shown on the "enemy" FEBA. Lieutenant Terekhov defined the missions for the crews in detail by radio and gave the command to open fire. After a while, the tank commanders reported the accomplishment of the mission and immediately received a direction for further attack.

A center of resistance--three PTOR's [antitank defense area]--suddenly appeared in the depth of the defense. The first and second tanks were ordered to attack them from the front, and the third--in the flank. Student S. Berezko, receiving the mission for a maneuver, lingered as he comprehended how to accomplish it. Without a ready decision, the platoon leader saw to it that the trainee himself found a way out of the difficult situation. The student issued a clear and short command:

"Driver, to the left of the lone tree, forward!"

"Roger," the driver-mechanic answered over the tank intercom.

Discovering the first target, the gunner reported:

"Right at the yellow stones a PTOR, 800."

This time student Berezko acted more confidently.

He quickly gave the command to destroy the dangerous target.

The commanders of the first and second tanks also assigned missions to the gunners to conduct fire at the "enemy." The targets were destroyed Then the combat vehicles reached a small hill. Following the tanks continuously on the APC, the officer accomplished a change in the crews, gave new instructions, and the tanks moved farther.

As is evident from the example, /questions of gunnery training were worked out in an inseparable connection with tactical training/ [in boldface].

Targets were raised unexpectedly on the left in sparse brush. The commander of the third tank, student Ye. Orlov, immediately reported:

"Tank counterattack on the left!"

Lieutenant Terekhov ordered repelling the tank counterattack from in place from behind cover. Outwardly, everything seemed to proceed as it should--the turrets were turned in the direction of the "enemy." However, the trainees committed an error here. The tank who duties as commander were accomplished by student Orlov dropped into a low place and had an extremely limited sector of fire. The second tank--of student I. Sentsov--presented its side to the attackers, and the third, where the commander was student S. Ptentsov, was too long in selecting natural cover.



Lieutenant Terekhov conducted a detailed partial critique of the crews' actions and pointed out shortcomings. And after this, he issued a new special situation--to repel a counterattack from behind cover. This time, the trainees displayed great quickness of wit and sharpness and they accomplished the assigned mission successfully.

The targets fell, the "enemy" began to withdraw. The mission was assigned for his pursuit. The tanks reformed into a column and rushed forward at maximum speed in order to cut the "enemy's" path of withdrawal.

Then the crews learned to operate in a patrol. The first tank moved along the road, the second on its right, and the third on its left. Many different targets had been set out in folds in the terrain on the entire route. The platoon leader received reports on the discovery of small "enemy" groups and he issued orders for their destruction.

But then, obstructions blocked the path for the patrols. The platoon leader ordered inspection of the obstacles and determination of ways to negotiate them.

Reports soon began to arrive from the students. Orlov reported that the obstruction had been mined, Semenov--that he had found a bypass, and Klimov assured that the obstacles were insurmountable. With the permission of the platoon leader, the trainees marked the training mines which had been discovered and bypassed the obstructions.

When the tankers reached the zone of "contaminated" terrain, the load on them increased sharply. Putting on their individual protective equipment, the students continued to accomplish the assigned mission. After passing through the dangerous zone the crews conducted partial special processing. Here, they competed for speed and quality in the accomplishment of combat standards for protection against weapons of mass destruction.

The tankers soon reached a destroyed bridge. They now had to look for a ford quickly and cross the river under the fire of the "enemy" who had taken cover on the opposite bank. Crossing the river, at the same time the crews learned to conduct target reconnaissance and to destroy them by fire on the march and from short halts. Subsequently, they executed a swift march and, seizing an advantageous position, they assumed the defense of a strong point. Here, they outlined foxholes, layed a minefield, drew a range card and then, under the direction of the squad commanders, accomplished special situations in repelling assaults.

The exchange of trainees occurred. The tanks received students of the second training squad who were engaged prior to this in dismounted tank training.

In the course of the lessons the organizational squad leaders went through the entire integrated tactical area and taught the students the necessary actions in combat. Sometimes, with the permission of Lieutenant Terekhov, they refined the actions of the crews by radio. It was they who distributed the students among the sectors, instructed them on how to designate the "enemy," gave the signals, and accomplished the change in squads.

The critique of the lessons on the integrated tactical area was conducted during the hours for self-study. The platoon and squad leaders assigned a grade to the actions of the trainees, cited those who had distinguished themselves, and pointed out shortcomings. Then they assigned missions for the immediate future.

/The lesson which took place contributed to raising the tactical and gunnery ability of the trainees and became one more step in the men's struggle for the complete accomplishment of the obligations which were assumed in combat training in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress/ [in boldface].

Tank Maintenance Procedures Described

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 81 (signed to press 22 Dec 80) pp 8-9

[Article by Warrant Officer L. Yegorychev, senior technician of a tank company, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Competently, Wisely"]

[Text] In the competition for a worthy greeting for the 26th Congress of the Communist Party, the tankers of our subunit are devoting great attention to questions of a zealous, thrifty attitude toward equipment. Competent maintenance of the units and assemblies of the tanks permits not only the successful accomplishment of training combat missions and a savings of fuel and lubricants, but also extending the periods between repairs.

The crew of the training combat vehicle consisting of Sergeant N. Metrinskiy, Private First Class N. Ivankov, and Private V. Dil'din succeeded in increasing the tank's run until major overhaul by 1,500 kilometers above the established norm. And this, under mountain terrain conditions where the engine and running gear experience increased loads. I explain this success, first of all, by Dil'din's professional qualities: he knows the equipment well, services it skillfully and, most important carefully, and has high indices in combat and political training.

The unit commander granted the leading soldier a deserved brief leave. Other driver-mechanics who achieved the best indices in the competition of the economical were also rewarded: Privates A. Mashanov, V. Dutov, A. Bukharov, Sh. Smagulov, and B. Sattybayev.

Captain A. Martynov, Senior Lieutenant V. Tokarev, and other officers of the subunit teach the tankers to service the vehicles zealously and wisely not only on days for working with the equipment in the park, but also in the course of planned lessons.

We recently established an unwritten rule: however difficult the conditions under which driving was conducted on the eve of a lesson, by the next morning each training combat vehicle must be prepared for operation. Therefore, when the roar of the engines subsides on the tank driving grounds, the crews begin a thorough inspections of the units and assemblies, conduct current preventive maintenance measures, and eliminate troubles which have been noted.

Private V. Dil'din provides an example of this for the personnel. The soldier conducts an inspection of the power plant, power supply assemblies, and units of the running gear with consideration of the nature of the track at the tank driving ground which abounds with numerous steep downgrades and upgrades and rocky sectors. Consequently, driving is accompanied by increased vibrations, shaking, severe shocks, and sudden turns. Considering this, the driver-mechanic first checks the tightness of connection of the piping, the integrity of the rubberized hoses, the tightening of threaded connections, and so forth. Thus, after one of the lessons he established in time that the fastening of the oil filter coupling had weakened. Another time

traces of oil were found in the tranamission compartment although no obvious damage to the oil line or joints could be seen. Starting the engine, Nil'din quickly disclosed the location of the leak: microscopic cracks through which the oil seeped under pressure had formed in one of the metal tubes. The trouble was eliminated. The soldier conducts a check of the tension of the belts on the PMP [turret traversing mechanism] and subsequent adjustment in a qualified manner.

The other driver-mechanics are just as attentive. Private V. Fomichev, for example, discovered a malfunction which is rarely encountered--a crack in the nave of the left driving wheel--after driving. Private A. Sokolov can share some useful experience. He often had to replace the pins and shoes of the caterpillar tracks in which cracks appeared during strikes against rocks.

/A mandatory and thorough inspection of the equipment immediately after each lesson and elimination of the slightest malfunctions--this is an effective preventive maintenance measure. The tightening of a nut or bolt, the fastening of a braid or pipe, or the replacement of a pin or track shoe in time contribute to the best preservation of the materiel, not to mention preventing various breakdowns/ [in boldface].

Another of our rules assists in the growth of technical knowledge, the accumulation of experience in repair work and, not in the least, instilling a sense of responsibility: the driver-mechanic who permitted a breakdown must eliminate it himself. This gives the young soldiers great assistance in acquiring practical skills. I know from my own experience that when you disassemble one or another unit or assembly, become familiar with its construction, establish the reason for a malfunction, and eliminate it, a sense of confidence that the materiel will not let you down in the future appears.

I recall that on one of the first trips out to the high-mountain tank driving grounds a driver-mechanic, Private A. Bayadilov, committed the reverse start of the engine. The soldier performed the maintenance of the system himself. He actions were checked by the company senior technician, Warrant Officer [praporshchik] S. Kolesnikov. The tanker did not operate very confidently. The experienced specialist prompted him in how to remove the air filter and perform the necessary operations, and he checked the quality of the work's accomplishment. Practice shows that young soldiers who have been enriched by experience subsequently perform repair operations more rapidly and with higher quality.

/In prolonging the periods between repairs, an important role is played by the unit maintenance and repair point. Its personnel, together with the crews, perform the unit repair of tanks. The repairs performed by our own personnel permit us to return the tanks to action more rapidly since the necessity to ship them for repair disappears/[in boldface].

Under the direction of officer M. Petrov and the senior company technician, Warrant Officer Yu. Shishigin, our tankers have learned to replace the engine, align its units and assemblies, install a new gear box, turret traversing mechanism, bogies, and equalizers and to look over the running gear. Thus, the tank commander, Junior Sergeant V. Kucherenko, and the driver-mechanic, Private A. Sokolov, worked along with the repairmen, Sergeant V. Orlov, Junior Sergeant V. Miroshnichenko, and Private Kh. Ramazanov. When our specialists, Kucherenko and Sokolov, were entrusted with repair of the second tank, only some minor help by Warrant Officer Shishgin was required.

The constant business-like cooperation with the repairmen helps the company's driver-mechanics to accomplish various operations on the equipment more effectively, which also has a beneficial effect on the preservation of the materiel. Thus, for the maintenance of storage batteries, we use a control panel made by a rationalizer, Junior Sergeant E. Klefenbayn. Here the training-checking cycle and the charging process are automated. The more improved technology of working with storage batteries permitted extending the time for their operation.

All these measures are directed toward increasing the equipment operating times between repairs and provide good results only in the case where they are consolidated by high individual driving skill. We direct the attention of the tankers to this aspect of training from the first days of combat training.

The subunit's tankers are responding to the Communist Party's concern for strengthening the might of our beloved motherland by a further rise in their soldierly skill and are striving to maintain the combat equipment which has been entrusted to us by the Soviet people competently and wisely.

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REACTIONS TO TRAINING CRITICISMS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen N. Red'kin. "What Changes Were Made Following the Criticism?"]

[Text] This article discusses the action taken by the political section of formation X of the National Air Defense Forces on criticism and proposal submitted by the communists at party report-and-election meetings.

Soldiers with the surface-to-air missile subunit in which Major G. Zharkov is secretary of the party organization performed their job outstandingly well while on combat alert. The specialists manning the command post performed especially smoothly. The news was greeted with special satisfaction by the workers in the political section. They had done a great deal of work in the party organization, helping the communists to rapidly eliminate the deficiencies pointed out in speeches at the party report-and-election meeting.

Naturally, it is mainly up to the primary party organization itself to follow up on the proposals and criticisms submitted by the communists, while the political organ is required to monitor the work. Its functions do not consist in monitoring implementation alone, however: It is also required to provide on-the-spot assistance. Communists with the party organization are not always capable of implementing some of the proposals made by the communists. This is where the organizing role of the political organ comes into play.

The shortcomings discussed at the report-and-election meeting by Captain Ye. Azarov and Major R. Berzov were the following: Officers manning the command post did not always appraise the tactical situation speedily and correctly; they sometimes failed to anticipate the air "enemy's" next maneuver; and they did not always select the most effective plan for firing the missiles. The criticisms leveled by the communists were immediately taken into account in the political section, and the decision was made to investigate the problem, together with staff specialists.

Soon after that there was a discussion of the specific proposal worked out by a group of officers headed by communist V. Sklyarov. It was proposed that an improved system be used for conducting training sessions for the officers at the command post. It included more hypothetical, practical problems and new information

on the tactics used by the air "enemy" and involved the use of various simulation equipment and means of applying psychological pressure to the missilemen performing combat alert duty. The leading command post specialists were introduced to the system at meetings addressed by supervisory personnel from the formation headquarters. The specialists exchanged know-how and learned how the classes were set up in the best subunits. All of this had a marked affect upon the missilemen's training.

And these were the results of serious consideration of the comments made by the communists at the party report-and-election meeting.

This is not always the case, however. Worthwhile, promising ideas and proposals are sometimes offered and severe criticism is heard at a meeting. It appears that the correct decisions are being made, but their practical implementation is put off from day to day.

People expect to be heard immediately, however, to have their ideas and proposals turn into specific action as rapidly as possible. A communist takes the floor at a party meeting in the hope that what he has to say will contribute to the performance of the common mission. He will naturally not be so eager to offer any proposals in the future, if no one indicates any interest in his opinion. Is this perhaps not the reason why certain party organizations have so little affect upon the life and work of the military collectives?

This matter was discussed in the formation political section just before the party-and-election meetings were held. What needed to be done to insure that not a single criticism or proposal was shelved, as they say? How could they organize the work of the political section itself so as to achieve the most effective possible implementation of all the advice offered by the communists?

The first thing to do, of course, was to set up a coordinated and efficient information system, to have the secretaries of party organizations and unit and subunit political workers promptly report to the formation political section on every criticism and proposal. Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Strizhak was ordered to make a thorough study for such an information system. The reports he prepared were discussed in the political section.

An analysis of the very first report-and-election meetings showed that the communists had spoken out on basic problems of combat training, military discipline and intraparty work.

The attention of workers with the political section was drawn to the information coming from the party organization of which Major G. Astaf'yev was secretary. The communists had serious complaints about the organization of socialist competition among the officers. It was only a formality, commitments were accepted only as a matter of routine, and the results were summed up only at random. Some of the officers had stopped thinking about their professional growth, only a few individuals were masters of combat skills, and a poor effort was being made to achieve complete interchangeability among the crews and squads.

"The officers do want to earn a first-class rating," Major G. Astaf'yev reported, "but then they do not demonstrate any sort of initiative or persistence at all. They feel that this is all that is required of them."

Why is the situation like this? One of the officers said it very plainly:

"I have accomplished my task. I have a first-class rating. What more do I need"?

Is this a problem? Of course, it is. In the interest of combat readiness the equipment must be serviced by specialists familiar with several different systems, who can perform the duties of any other member. The problem is a serious one. If a certain portion of the officers are convinced that they can rest on their laurels, since they have fulfilled the mandatory "minimum," then what can they expect of those who are not even members of the party?

This matter was discussed at a party meeting dealing with the tasks for the new training year. The talk was not limited to a purely technical discussion of the problem. The communists spoke boldly and frankly about taking an honorable attitude toward the assigned job.

Reality has convinced us that competition should be regarded as an effective means of striving to further strengthen combat readiness. In the past, an officer would accept a commitment "to service the equipment with excellence," and everyone would believe that he was competing. With whom was he competing, however? What specific goal did he want to achieve? When did he expect to reach it?

The commanders, political workers and party activists talked more than once with those who would try to get off in the old way by making general statements and vague promises. As a result, about a third of the officers decided to strive for the title "master of combat skill."

Certain criticism offered by the communists require intervention at once, and the effect is immediately apparent to all. For example, Senior Lieutenant A. Voronkov, a communist, brought up the fact that the boiler room was not operating properly and that it was cold in the soldiers' barracks. He mentioned specific names of individuals, including communist A. Zykin and others, who were responsible for delays in repairing the heat lines and for not putting things in order in the boiler room. The political section immediately responded to the complaint. Workers from the section had a serious talk with those to blame for the situation, as a result of which the required specialists were assigned and the necessary materials were allocated for repairing the boiler room.

In this case the effect from following up on the criticism was felt by everyone immediately--the barracks had heat. Sometimes, however, attempts are made to pass off written reports or the frivolous promise that "it will be done" as operational efficiency. This is what Major V. Titovich, secretary of the party organization, did, as an example. He reported to the political section that action had been taken on criticisms from communists M. Etko and V. Zyuz'kov. As it turned out, nothing had changed: Classes and drills were being simplified in the same old way, and there were the same shortcomings in the organization of periodic maintenance work.

The political section decided to take charge of all the proposals and criticisms heard during the reports and elections. A schedule was compiled for following through on them. As a result, the political section workers have a clear picture of the situation. They know which party organizations resolve urgent matters without delay and which ones daily and fail to complete what they have started. Immediate steps are taken in the latter case, of course.

Future plans of the political section call for the communists in supervisory positions to report on what they are doing specifically to follow up on criticisms and proposals. This is increasing the responsibility for successful accomplishment of the assigned tasks and motivating them to deal more concretely with things which are bothering the communists.

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TRAINING ACTIVITIES

On the Large ASW Ship "Sderzhannyy"

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank Mikhal'chenko, commander of the large ASW ship "Sderzhannyy": "Perfected at Sea"]

[Text] Lieutenant P. Kichkin, a section chief, heard some unpleasant news. The officers in the division had unanimously agreed that it would be better if he, Kichkin, were not permitted to sail on the ship any longer. And although the lieutenant knew that his fate would be decided by the ship commander and at headquarters, he also knew that the opinion of the collective would certainly be taken into account.

Kichkin came to me with a complaint about his colleagues. I had to remind the young officer that after a year and a half he was still not certified to run the group or to stand watch by himself. And who needs passengers at sea?

"I will do my utmost. I will go without sleep, but I will earn my certification," Kichkin assured me. "Just don't leave me ashore."

And he did indeed pass the necessary tests before the ship left on the cruise. He was helped and his work was monitored by Captain 3d Rank V. Orlovskiy, the division chief. He had been willing to help and advise the lieutenant even before this, which meant that the most important change occurred in Kichkin himself. Was it a change or just a temporary effect of circumstances? We observed the young officer during the long cruise and became convinced that he had thoroughly changed his attitude toward the service.

The officers were pleased with their comrade's achievements. Another interesting thing occurred. At one time I had held off on recommending Kichkin for his next promotion, although it was time. A few months after the cruise began, the division chief and its political worker and the party activists themselves told me that the lieutenant deserved to be promoted. I agreed, and Senior Lieutenant Kichkin was soon receiving hearty congratulations in the wardroom. It seemed to at that time that he became even more convinced of the great importance of a demanding but well-meaning collective in the officer's life, one which is interested in the service and the life of every member.

Not so long ago we saw Senior Lieutenant Kichkin off to a new assignment, a higher position.

There is a great deal to be learned from Kichkin's story. The collective's opinion and the voice of the active members constitute a great indoctrinational force. Do we know how to take advantage of this force, to rely upon it? Do we understand the patterns involved in the making of collective opinion, in its development with time? It seems to me that reality itself forces us to persistently search for the answers to these questions.

There are especially great possibilities for indoctrination on a cruise and during the period of preparation for the cruise. The importance of the tasks and the severity of the tests encountered on a long cruise mean that greater demands will be made of every crew member, especially the officers. Skillful advantage must be taken of this fact for purposes of uniting the team of officers.

Officer meetings, which were at one time unjustifiably disregarded, have been returned to the fore by practical reality, because of their effectiveness. They plan an especially large role on a ship out on a long cruise. For long weeks at a time the wardroom serves as the main area of contact among the officers, a center where common views are worked out with respect both to many service issues and to personal ethics of behavior or relationships within the collective.

I am going to use Engineer-Lieutenant V. Afanas'yev as an example. The young officer had a poor knowledge of the men under him and relied unsatisfactorily upon the warrant officers and petty officers. He tried to do everything himself, but he would frequently make mistakes or not complete something he had started. He sometimes resorted to trickery. If a machine broke down, Afanas'yev would have a ready explanation: There was nothing we could do. We do not have a spare drivebelt. He showed no initiative. When it became necessary to conserve drinking water, Afanas'yev was not able to handle the simple, technical task. It seemed as though the officer were working hard, but there was little effect. Basic things were not getting done. He could not understand it when he was criticized: Why was the commander dissatisfied? Why did he need to change his workstyle?

And then, at an officers' meeting, he began to understand a great deal. His comrades in the wardroom explained to Afanas'yev frankly and in plain terms the nature of his errors and how he looked to an unbiased observer. Afanas'yev actually was hearing nothing new: Most of the criticisms came as no surprise to him. The officer accepted them and reacted in a completely new way, however. Not long after the meeting ended he reported that a drivebelt had been found--the men had made it themselves. He submitted a rationalization proposal and then implemented it himself. As a result, losses of fresh water were reduced. Afanas'yev also managed to reconsider his relationships with the men under him, and this helped matters in the section.

Exercise critiques have great indoctrinational value. Since the combat training is ordinarily more intensive than usual on a long cruise, the number of critiques also increases. At any rate, everything depends upon the soundness of the reasoning provided in the critique and upon the objectives. It can be limited to the technology of the combat work, but it can also consider the personalities of the people who are behind that work and their attitude toward the job. I would list uncompromising demandingness as among the qualities of basic importance. It was stated at the 25th CPSU Congress that all sides of a specific worker should be objectively appraised, in order to thoroughly analyze existing defects with a view to eliminating them.

It was practice torpedo firing against a surface target. When the maneuvering was at its peak I noticed that I did not have adequate information to make the final decision. "Why hasn't the control station crew reported?" I asked Senior Lieutenant V. Dontsov. I found out that the set had been turned on late, and this had resulted in an error in determining the target course.

At the critique Dontsov tried to make excuses. He said that it was the crew's job to issue information on air targets and that this attack was against a surface ship. It has long been the rule, however, that in a training battle we use all of the radio electronic facilities in combination. Dontsov had not fulfilled this requirement.

Naturally, it was pointed out during the analysis of the attack that failure to carry out instructions is one of the most serious violations of service duty. The officers who spoke during the critique underscored the fact that Dontsov should demonstrate more responsibility, presence of mind and initiative. I had to support this just demand. The officer derived the proper conclusions from the criticism. During an exercise held soon thereafter his crew performed extremely smoothly. The attack was rated excellent.

It is not always so easy or simple to find a way to influence an officer, however. Once, on a long cruise, I was evaluating one of the regular training missions in the communications division commanded by Captain Lieutenant S. Vasil'yev. I knew that he was a veteran officer, and I was therefore considerably surprised when I discovered a large number of shortcomings. I learned that he had turned the entire training task over to a lieutenant, deciding to "save his strength" to prepare the division for an upcoming inspection by headquarters. What was his reasoning? He believed that "his own" internal ship's inspection would not be a rigid one, that the merits and prestige of the commander would protect the division against criticism. And then an all-out effort would be made to correct the situation prior to the inspection by headquarters.

I will not deny the fact that I had to weigh the situation carefully. Was it worth criticizing a veteran and respected officer in front of the wardroom for his very first negligence? Would it not be better simply to reprimand him with just the two of us present? I had to answer the logical question of how this method of handling the situation in private would affect the group of officers.

The situation could not be hushed up, and the officers would be discussing it, of course. And might this silent treatment of the matter not dislodge community opinion from those points of principle which we had tried to establish among the officers? These considerations decided the matter. It might not appear to be to the benefit of Captain Lieutenant Vasil'yev, but it would actually be to both his benefit and that of the communications division as a whole. That critique evoked a profound response in the officers' wardroom and had far-reaching moral effects. People began to evaluate themselves more stringently, and some of them began correcting deficiencies without waiting for the inspection.

Within five days Captain Lieutenant Vasil'yev had thoroughly prepared the division for the inspection, although I considered it necessary to lower the rating by one point--for the last-minute, all-out effort, which could have been entirely avoided.

I would like to point out the possibilities provided by socialist competition for indoctrinating the officers. I recall the acute reaction of Engineer-Lieutenant V. Paramoshkov's colleagues to the fact that he did not accept commitments for the crews and left competition in his subunit to just drift along. The officer acknowledged his defects but was in no hurry to correct them. He did not understand the full seriousness of the situation until after the Komsomol committee had gone over his personal file at the petition of an officers' meeting. At this point he came to his senses, so to speak. The group of officers is now helping Paramoshkov to fit into place in the formation and to make up for his derelictions. I think that this is within the capabilities of both a collective which has been tested by a long ocean cruise and of Engineer-Lieutenant Paramoshkov, for whom the test continues.

On the Large Guided Missile Ship "Smelyy"

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank Ya. Knyazeve, Red Banner Black Sea Fleet: "The Miles of Cruising for the 'Smelyy'"]

[Text] "It's a good one," the captain said, when he finished reading the Komsomol committee's workplan for the cruise. "I would give you just one piece of advice: Don't scatter your forces. Try to affect the crucial areas of the work...."

He penciled in a few comments on the plan, and Warrant Officer A. Zagradskiy easily followed the commander's thought process: The systematic performance of combat training tasks must be backed up with efficient and flexible work on the part of the aktiv, with the skillful regrouping, if I may, of the Komsomol forces.

The secretary spent the very next evening refining the specific details of the plan and thoroughly analyzing it with the deputy commander for political affairs. And so, when the large missile ship "Smelyy" left its home base and set out to sea, he felt fully prepared, at ease and confident. Together with the members of the Komsomol committee Zagradskiy had "run through," as it were, all the phases of the forthcoming exercise: the search for the submarine, the attack with depth

charges and the missile firing at an air target. He had given the aktiv an orientation in all these phases, and each member had a clear picture of his own personal tasks. Everything had been taken into account and thought out, and now, when the ship was on its way to the designated area, the secretary could not help trying to make the time pass faster: The sooner, the better!

...The sonar operators were the first to begin their combat work. Warrant Officer Zagradskiy, together with Warrant Officer G. Tarabuyev, senior sonar operator, and the subunit commander, had discussed the best way to organize the competition by task and norm. They had designated three main criteria for determining the best shift: accuracy in determining the coordinates of the "enemy" submarine, reliability and continuity of contact, and discipline in standing the watch. It was decided to try something new--to sum up the results not for 24-hour periods, but after every shift. This would make it possible to increase rivalry, to have a better idea at all times of who was ahead and who was behind, and to publicize progressive experience. There was not a single, even slightly important aspect of the sonar operators' work, which escaped the attention of the committee secretary. It was decided how the activists would be distributed, agitators were selected, and an individual with initiative was appointed editor of the operational news sheet.

The first to detect the submarine in the adverse conditions was Petty Officer 2d Class N. Zinov'yev. Petty Officer 2d Class V. Smolin also stood watch with exceptional vigilance and distinguished himself in the next phase of the exercise. The example set by the outstanding men inspired the entire crew.

Now, according to the plan, the committee members shifted the focus of their work to the mine and torpedo division (BCh-3). Preparations were under way there to destroy the "enemy" submarine with depth charges. How well had the Komsomol members and underwater weapons experts prepared for the battle? Who was ahead? Who was holding things up? The activists were concerned about many things. Senior Lieutenant O. Kolobordenko, the BCh-3 commander, and Warrant Officer V. Pokin'chereda, secretary of the subunit primary Komsomol organization, were aware of the committee's help and support in every aspect of the work. The committee members made an unannounced inspection of the battle stations and checked on the sailors' preparedness to perform the exercise. Upon learning that Petty Officer 1st Class A. Nadyrov, chief of the underwater weapons section, had skillfully organized competition for excellent preparation of the section for the firing, the activists promptly informed the other sections in the division of this experience and prepared a special radio report.

A climate of great combat and patriotic enthusiasm reigned on board the ship. While the exercise was in progress the Komsomol members requested that certain personnel be accepted into the CPSU. Holding a meeting in such a tense situation naturally created certain difficulties. The stimulating effect of accepting the best of the fighting men into the party while an exercise was under way could not be ignored, however. This opinion was shared by the commander and the secretary of the party organization. Komsomol members A. Yakovlev and V. Zakharchenko, who had distinguished themselves on the cruise, were unanimously accepted as candidate CPSU members.

The activists devoted a great deal of attention to the proper utilization of moral incentives during the training. They suggested that the winners of the competition by task and norm be rewarded with a commemorative photograph. This had been done before, of course, but ordinarily only on important holidays, at the base. Now, it was being proposed that this be done on a cruise. And the idea received support. Soon, many of the members received commemorative photographs, and Petty Officer 2d Class A. Kovtunyan received a valuable award. This was extensively publicized. The competition for first place took on even greater scope.

The final result of the exercise was gratifying. The ship received an excellent rating for the firing.

On this cruise the Komsomol committee performed with vigor and in a goal-oriented manner, attempting to spread its influence to all aspects of the crew's service and life. A special evening gathering planned by the activists made a deep impression on the hearts of the sailors. Letters from former frontline soldiers, the fathers of fighting men now serving on the ship, and their instructions to their sons were read during the meeting.

Warrant Officer I. Chornyy, a war veteran, a veteran member of the ship's crew and a delegate to the 25th CPSU Congress, told the youth in a Lenin class about the great achievements occurring since the 25th CPSU Congress and about the CPSU Central Committee's draft "Main Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for the Years 1981-1985 and the Period Extending to 1990."

I could mention many other worthwhile activities of the Komsomol members on the "Smelyy" during the cruise. The appraisal of their work given by the commander back at the base was perhaps most important of all to the activists, however.

"I thank my reliable assistants," he said and vigorously shook the hand of Warrant Officer Zagradskiy.

ASW Training Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank M. Khramtsov: "The Temple of the Attack"]

[Text] At the height of the exercise the commander of the raiding party received a report from an escort vessel that an "enemy" submarine had been detected. The commander analyzed the information and determined that the ASW personnel had made a mistake, that it was a dummy target. Time was lost, attention was diverted, and the "enemy" submarine for which the party was searching managed to break through to its designated area. It took a great deal of effort to detect the submarine before it could use its weapons.

The seagoing ASW crew (KPR), which had committed an error and misled the entire group, was led during this phase of the exercise by Captain Lieutenant V. Savosik, executive officer. Unfortunately, he had used only the reports from the sonar operator on watch. He had not demanded a detailed classification of the contact

with the target from other battle stations and had not carefully analyzed the hydrological conditions, the characteristics of the search area or the nature of the target's maneuvering. It was these omissions which led to the serious tactical error.

It is possible, of course, to confuse ASW personnel in the classification of targets with the technical equipment on board a modern submarine, of course. If clever tactical maneuvering is also used, then the possibility is not ruled out that a submarine may break away from pursuit even after it has been detected. Naturally, this turn of events can have grave consequences for the opponent. Can this be prevented? Absolutely. But only if the ship commander does not delay, if he organizes the combat work of the ASW crew so that the seamen do not waste a single second and make contact rapidly. This requires great skill on the part of each specialist.

The tempo of the search and attack today are such that only a smoothly functioning crew is capable of succeeding in a modern naval battle. And the commander sets the pace in the combat work.

The following is a typical occurrence.

A difficult search was under way. All of the sailors, especially the sonar operators, were working intently. At last, they reported that they could hear the noise made by the propellers of the "enemy" submarine. A little later, however, they reported that they had lost contact with the target.

Captain 2d Rank Yu. Ryzhkov, ship commander, instantly analyzed the situation, issued the necessary instructions to the helmsmen, informed the sonar operators of the situation at once and then demanded that the navigator and the other seamen on the seagoing ASW crew step up mutual control. The loss of contact with the target did not create any nervousness in the work of the ASW personnel but only caused them to redouble their efforts and their vigilance. Commands were issued smoothly and thorough reports were made so that there was no need to waste valuable minutes requesting additional information or clarifications. The ship commander's decisive and resourceful actions and the coordination and training of the crew made it possible rapidly to reestablish contact with the "enemy" submarine.

It was interesting that the young officer standing watch sometimes felt that Captain 2d Rank Ryzhkov was basing his decisions more on instructions than on his own calculations. This was not the case, of course. The ship commander's considerations were based on his knowledge of the specific nature of the search area. He knew that the water was shallow to the north, so that the "enemy" would not risk going there. And the nature of the forthcoming operations ruled out the area to the west. Actually, even the southern part of the area presented certain difficulties for maneuvering. Only the area to the east was left, and Captain 2d Rank Ryzhkov issued instructions to take up a position there. His calculation proved to be the right one.

The development of submarine forces has repeatedly increased the difficulty of the missions performed by ASW personnel, and consequently, it has increased their training requirements. Reality itself has prompted us to take a comprehensive approach to the training and indoctrination of ASW crews, to adhere to a strict system in which each element is important.

This is precisely how officer Yu. Ryzhkov operates. The first stage consists of exercises and drills conducted onboard the ship, during the course of which the ASW personnel learn how to obtain, analyze and depict information on the "enemy" and the situation. The stress is on making each training activity highly effective and improving the training of each specialist. For this purpose, the training process includes direct rivalry and the operational dissemination of progressive experience. Training exercises are then conducted with a group of ships. Complex maneuvering and joint operations are worked out in this stage. In the final stage, which consists in actually searching for and attacking underwater training targets, the personnel perfect the combat techniques for which coordination at every level is absolutely essential.

It is at sea, of course, on real cruises, that we can truly test and increase the training of the ASW personnel, their ability to find an underwater enemy rapidly, to attack daringly and destroy with certainty. Let us not forget, however, that a training cruise by a single ship, not to speak of an exercise involving a group of ships, means consuming considerable amounts of energy and using up significant amounts of engine life. This is why it is the accepted rule in the fleet initially to work out at training facilities on shore all of the tactical tasks and combat exercises which provide ASW personnel with the necessary knowledge and skills. These facilities have recently been outfitted with modern training devices which make it possible to simulate or model situations approaching combat reality. As a rule, the drills are performed by all members of the ship's ASW crew. Participation by the specialists in squadron exercises makes it possible to fill the training process with highly dynamic situations, to perform skillful critiques of the attacks and to see the achievements as well as detect weak spots in the training of the crews.

The ASW personnel will not soon forget a critique of an attack made by Captain Lieutenant S. Rozhkov, for example. He thoroughly analyzed every phase of the ASW crew's duel with the "enemy" submarine, gave a well-reasoned appraisal of the sailors' training and advised them to work on their interaction. His suggestions made it possible for the ASW specialists to make their combat work markedly more dynamic, to create training conditions similar to those of an actual naval battle. It came as no surprise that this crew has distinguished itself at sea.

Simply stated, the ASW personnel operate by the principle that an untrained crew has no business going to sea. Only when the necessary level of precision has been achieved in the performance of the sailors is the process of perfecting a crew's combat training transferred to the ocean. The complex tactical situation, active "enemy" counteraction and the whims of nature all make it necessary for the ASW personnel to put all their knowledge and skills into play. This is where they will recall with gratitude the intense work performed on the training devices.

I have a reason for focusing on this matter. Some officers still have a tendency to regard the training on shore as an auxiliary, even a non-mandatory part of the combat integration of a crew. They do not say so, of course, but their attitude toward the training on shore is apparent. What can be said about this? First of all, we must resolutely combat such views, since they are basically incorrect. The most efficient way to achieve combat skill today is by combining intensive training ashore with the schooling acquired on ocean cruises. It is on shore in the training rooms and on the simulators that we build the successful foundation for hard-won victories at sea. To think otherwise is to deliberately doom oneself to failure.

Senior Lieutenant Yu. Sankin said that he was too busy preparing the equipment for the cruise as his excuse for having stopped working with his men in the training room. "We will catch up on the cruise," was his response when he was criticized. Unfortunately, the ship's commander not only failed to correct the lieutenant but actually shared the latter's point of view in some ways. The inadequate training of the sailors rapidly made itself felt. Certain specialists proved to be poorly prepared to search for underwater targets, and this affected the results of the combat training for the entire crew.

This sort of thing occurs rarely, of course. And we have mentioned it only as a means of stressing the fact that everything having to do with the training of the ASW personnel is important, everything is interrelated. Take, for example, the act of gaging the condition of the water at sea, which is used as the basis for calculating the anticipated range of the scanning equipment. This would not be classified as a difficult operation, but it is an extremely important one. Despite this, it takes considerable effort to teach certain officers to follow absolutely the procedure for taking the readings. The same holds true, incidentally, with respect to achieving coordinated action between sailors in the radio technical service (RTS) and those of the electrical and engineering division (BCh-5). During the last training year there were cases in which BCh-5 specialists made mistakes with respect to coverage of mainlines involved in radio electronic operations. The errors were made simply because the specialists did not thoroughly understand how the ship's systems interact during the search for an underwater "enemy" and during the attack. And the slightest breakdown has an immediate effect upon the speed of the attack and upon the actions of the ship's ASW crew.

During the search for the "enemy" and during the attack the ship's ASW crew (KPR) is something like the brain of the crew, the main element in its combat organization. It is primarily the training and coordination of the KPR which determine how well the crew performs the tactical tasks and combat exercises. The KPR obtains, analyzes and depicts information on the "enemy" and the situation and works out recommendations, on the basis of which the ship's commander makes his decision. Great demands are therefore made of all the sailors on the crew. It is important to equip them with specific knowledge and skills, to polish up their combat technology, so to speak. It is equally important to develop will-power, persistence and determination in the sailors. Experience has shown that letups in the speed of the attack are due not only to deficiencies in the training

of individual sailors, but also to purely psychological factors. Every commander regards the need to unite training and indoctrination as axiomatic. It is sometimes a long way from recognition of this fact to its implementation, however. The task is one of striving in a planned and comprehensive manner to perfect the moral qualities and fighting efficiency of every ASW specialist--and with action, not with words. When this is done, he is capable of coping with the very highest attack speed needed to insure victory in the battle, in any sort of situation.

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